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1. INTRODUCTION
Modern China (or the People's Republic of China ("P.R.C."))
is as complex and imposing as ancient China was mysterious.
With well over one billion people, ample natural resources, a tra-
dition of creative and inventive genius during pre- and mid-
dynastic periods, and an emerging market-based economy possess-
ing the potential to become one of the world's largest economic
engines in the twenty-first century, the long-tortuous, but re-
cently rapid evolution of China's attitudes toward property rights
in invention and discovery commands attention. It is now almost
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universally recognized that technological change is critical to
long-term economic growth.' Encouraging technological re-
search, development, and commercialization through effective
government policies is a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition
for the advancement of China's developing economy. Thus, the
new Chinese patent system2 and its practical implementation pro-
vide an illuminating partial portrait of attitudinal change.
Although knowledgeable observers have had their differences
about whether the role of patents in encouraging technological
advancement and commercialization outweighs their arguably an-
ticompetitive exclusionary effects, today's consensus is that the
benefits of an appropriately tailored patent system more than
counterbalance its costs.3 The point is essentially moot except in
debates over how to fine-tune patent systems to seek a more
nearly optimal balance of competing public interests. From the
perspective of a developing country such as China, it is an ines-
capable fact that all developed nations have correspondingly well-
developed patent systems, and that the increasing interdepend-
1 With his foundational work in the 1950s, Robert Solow led the way to-
ward general acceptance of this proposition. See, e.g., Robert Solow, Technical
Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312
(1957 (setting out to measure the effect of increased capital on productivity
and finding that in the 1909-1949 period approximately 80% of the productiv-
ity increase was actually attributable to a combination of technological change
and improved quality in the workforce). See also EDWARD F. DENISON,
ACCOUNTING FOR UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH 1929-1969, at 128
(1974) (estimating that, with economies of scale isolated, 27% of U.S. economic
growth between 1929 and 1969 was partly attributable to advances in knowl-
edge); EDWARD F. DENISON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE ALTERNATIVES BEFORE US 271-72 (Brookings Inst.,
1962) (estimating that 36% of the rise in output per worker between 1929 and
1957 was attributable to the advance of knowledge); F.M. Scherer, Inter-
Industry Technology Flows and Productivity Growth, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT.
627 (1982) (estimating that in the post-WWII era research and development
("R&D") has contributed about one percentage point per year to U.S. produc-
tivity, or about half of the annual rate of growth in productivity).
2 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (1992), reprinted in 2
China L. for Foreign Bus. (CCH 14,201 Gan. 1, 1993) [hereinafter P.R.C.
Patent Law].
3 See, e.g., ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 84-85 (1990).
4 See Gao Lulin, A Preliminary Analysis of the TRIPS Negotiations of the
Uruguay Round of GATT, CHINA PAT. & TRADEMARK Q., Jan. 1993, at 8, 9
(noting that more than 100 countries are signatories of the Uruguay Round of
GATT, nearly 30 others comply with its provisions, and that these countries
together account for over 90% of world trade volume).
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ence of virtually all economies means that China must act like-
wise to be a true participant in the global economy.'
In our tracing of Chinese attitudes toward invention and dis-
covery, one can see that a culture deeply embedded with tradi-
tions completely antithetical to the patenting of inventions and to
the granting of property rights in other forms of intellectual
products has recently moved toward recognition of the necessity
of a modern patent system. Realizing this necessity was first a
function of attracting foreign investment and obtaining favorable
trade status, as one would expect of any nation with a relatively
undeveloped economy. The Chinese also seem to have realized
that an effective patent system accessible to Chinese nationals
may foster the entrepreneurial spirit essential to an internally
driven shift to market economics. Although the evidence indi-
cates that progress is definitely being made, it likewise suggests
that realization of the patent system's potential for helping to
drive internal technological advancement may be some time
away.6
Some who have studied recent developments in China's intel-
lectual property laws generally, and patent laws particularly, are
quite sanguine about the likelihood of success for these develop-
ments.7 Others, however, remain unconvinced that China has
developed, or will even ultimately develop, an effective patent
s See, e.g., Tang Zong Shun, The Chinese Patent System in the Service of Mod-
ernization, CHINA PAT. & TRADEMARK Q., April 1992, at 23, 24 (explaining
that the fundamental aim of patents in China, as elsewhere, is to accelerate the
spread and application of inventions and transform them into productive
forces); Intellectual Property Protection in China, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, June 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File
(explaining that, if effective, intellectual property reform in China can not only
promote science and technology, but also can make positive contributions to-
ward the development and optimization of the international intellectual prop-
erty system).
6 See P.R.C. Patent Law, supra note 2. The first modern patent law was
passed in 1984 but did not become effective until 1985; substantial amendments
were adopted in 1992 and became effective in 1993.
' See, e.g., Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law Enforcement in China:
Trade Issues, Policies and Practices, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 63, 82 (1997); Lawrence P. Harrington, Note, Recent Amendments to
China's Patent Law: The Emperor's New Clothes?, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 337, 337-39 (1994) (predictin4 future integration into the world economy
by China because of patent reform).
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system. Some are simply unconvinced that centuries-old Chinese
cultural traditions can be reversed in the foreseeable future.'
Others are unpersuaded that entrepreneurialism and other hall-
marks of an efficient market economy can coexist with socialistic
and authoritarian policies."0
The P.R.C.'s 1985 patent law, with major amendments in
1993 that rendered it similar to the patent laws of many well-
developed nations, 1 clearly cannot contribute substantially to the
nation's long-term economic development unless several other
conditions also are met. We discuss several of these additional
requisites for an otherwise well-designed and well-implemented
patent system to fulfill its role in aiding economic maturation.
Among the most obvious are the following: (1) The continuing
commitment of the Chinese leadership to the development of a
market-based economy is essential. This commitment does not
require a great deal of discussion because it appears to be very real
and sustained, seemingly subject only to the possibility of future
negative political developments. 2 We can only speculate about
' See, e.g., Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and the
Former Soviet Union and its Effects Upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46
BuFF. L. REv. 1, 3 (1998).
9 See id. at 4-5.
10 See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK is AN ELEGANT
OFFENSE: INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 2-3
(1995).
n See supra note 6; see also infra Section V.
12 As the P.R.C.'s leaders undoubtedly have seen, increased prosperity is
necessary for Ion -term political stability. At some point, however, the politi-
cal leadership prolably faces a paradox. If their plans succeed and the Chinese
people prosper, the nation's much sought-after economic success may clash
wit itslack of political freedom. There are many who having gained a certain
degree of economic well-being, may begin to think about higher-order values
such as political freedom. Although no one can predict the level to which this
tension will rise or how the many possible scenarios are likely to play out,
there is reason for optimism that economic imperatives and political reason
will prevail over time. See generally MVI1LTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 7-21 (1962) (arguing that a capitalist economy can co-exist with to-
talitarianism for a time, but that economic and political freedom are too inter-
twined for them to exist in opposite states for a long period of time, and also
observing that the author's views echo those of notable economists such as
Edward Dicey, Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Julian Simon).
Until very recently, any questions about possible adverse political changes
would have related only to changes in the P.R.C. In June 1999, however, ques-
tions arose about the future of Sino-U.S. relations as a result of alleged espio-
nage by Chinese agents. See, e.g., Stan Crock et al., The New China Syndrome,
Bus. WK., June 7, 1999, at 30. Although a U.S. economic pullback from Sino-
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U.S. trade certainly would be a major setback for China's economic moderni-
zation effort, it is unlikely to happen for several reasons:
(1) China wants to join the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), and fur-
ther lowering various trade barriers, including those caused by ineffec-
tive intellectual property protection, is a prerequisite. See, e.g., Fran-
ces Williams, Elimination of Tariffs by WTO Members Sought, FN.
TIMES (LONDON), June 25, 1999, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Fintme File (describing leading chemical industries' urging of
WTO members to substantially reduce tariffs on chemicals, with
China expressing a willingness to do the same in preparation for
WTO entry); Foley Urges Japan to Fuel Economic Recovery, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE, June 25, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Jen File (explaining that U.S. ambassador to Japan Thomas Foley be-
lieves that China may join the WTO by the end of the year); Dexter
Roberts, A Tale of Two Families, Bus. Wk., June 28, 1999, at 52 (focus-
ing on the disparate effects of economic modernization on differently
situated Chinese people and observing that Washington and Beijing
are both seeking to resolve the remaining obstacles to China's WTO
membership); Seminar to Brief Officials, Entrepreneures on WTO,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 25, 1999, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Xinhua File (reporting on P.R.C. leaders briefing Chinese
government officials and-business people about the WTO and the
long-term benefits of membership).
(2) Most business leaders, the U.S. administration, and U.S. congressional
leaders recognize that Chinese membership in the WTO will inure to
the long-term benefit of the United States itself. See, e.g., Crock, supra,
at 31; Foley Urges Japan, supra; Laura D. Tyson, Why the U.S. Should
Welcome China to the WITO, Bus. WK., May 31, 1999, at 30.
(3) Even after the reports of alleged espionage, President Clinton called
for a renewal of China's most-favored nation ("AIFN") status. But de-
spite saber rattling in Congress, a two-thirds vote in both houses is re-
quired to revoke the status and many members of Congress see the
long-term advantages of maintaining and improving trade ties with
China. See, e.g., Nancy Dunne, Fight on China's MFN Begins, FIN.
TIMES (LONDON), June 4, 1999, at 7 available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Fintme Fie. Unsurprisingly, on July 27, 1999 the -ouse voted
to extend China s MFN status (of course, it only takes a favorable vote
from one of the two houses). See, e.g., Paul Bluestein, House Extends
China's Trade Status; Vote, Heated Debate Set Stage for Battle Over Bei-
Jing's WTO Bid, WASH. POST, July 28, 1999, at A20. If the P.R.C. ul-
timately does become a member of the WTO, this annual ritual con-
cerning the renewal of its MFN status will cease. As an aside,
numerous articles in the news media reported on an almost daily basis
that the combination of political division at the top in China, coupled
with the usual group of China-bashers in the U.S. Congress, could
slow down China's entry into the WTO. Whatever the delay, how-
ever, too many nations want it to occur for it to not be viewed as in-
evitable. See, e.g., Ian Johnson & Helene Cooper, U.S. Trade Officials
Invite Chinese to Washington for Talks on W7O, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23,
1999, at A14 (noting progress of Sino-U.S. talks); Ian Johnson, Divided
Beijing Pushes Deadline or Joining WITO By 1999's End, WALL ST.
Sept. 20., 1999, at A20 (noting some evidence of division among the
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future Sino-U.S. political relations from the perspective of either
nation, and such speculation is beyond the scope of this article.
The commitment itself is unaffected by the current recession
throughout much of Asia, except that it may actually harden the
leadership's resolve to strengthen the nation's economy suffi-
ciently to make it better able to weather downturns of this na-
ture, especially those like the present one that is substantially at-
tributable to economic problems in Japan, Korea, Singapore, and
other countries in the region. (2) A similarly sustained commit-
ment to the development of China's legal system as a whole, as
well as its intellectual property regime, is clearly imperative. The
P.R.C. must have both an attractive economic climate and a fair,
dependable, and relatively efficient legal system to persuade for-
eign companies to do more business there and especially to trans-
fer technology there. Financial institutions require the same if
they are to increase direct foreign investment in Chinese eco-
nomic growth. Moreover, Chinese enterprises ultimately will re-
quire similar conditions if they are to carry out the role that they
must play in order for them to contribute meaningfully to inter-
nally driven growth and technological development; an economy
that depends predominantly on foreign investment and technol-
ogy transfer is still a developing economy. (3) The infusion of re-
PRC's leadership, but also noting that almost all of the WTO's 134 na-
tions have already voted to let China join).
One major hurdle was overcome just before this article went to press.
Over the November 13-14, 1999 weekend, which the U.S. had set as a final
deadline, China and the U.S. finally reached agreement on the opening of key
Chinese markets (such as telecommunications and financial services) and the
lowering of tariffs. See, e.g., In Historic Pact, U.S. Opens Way for China to Fi-
nally Join WTO, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1999, at Al. As of this writing, in or-
der for China to gain WTO entry relatively soon, it still needs to conclude a
similar agreement with the European Union before November 30, 1999, which
is far more likely after the Sino-American accord. See id. To demonstrate how
close to the edge the negotiations were before agreement, the Monday, No-
vember 15, 1999 print edition of the Wall Street Journal carried an article indi-
cating that the talks appeared to be on the verge of failure. See Ian Johnson,
U.S. and China Dig in Heels During Extended Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., Nov.
15, 1999, at A2. However, the Interactive (on-line) edition of the Wall Street
Journal posted the story on the final success of the talks in the early morning
hours of November 15.
Another postscript is in order. After the Cox Report accused China of es-
pionage on a wide scale, the Chinese produced an extremely thorough rebuttal
that essentially debunked all meaningfl portions of the Cox Report. See Mar-
cus W. Brauchli, China Rebuts U.S. Allegations of Atomic-Weapons Espionage,
WALL ST. J., July 16, 1999, at A12.
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sources to non-military research and development must be ex-
panded greatly. It is to be expected that an economy still in its
early stages of development will depend primarily on foreign in-
vestment and foreign technology (acquired either legally or ille-
gally) for quite some time. Again, however, this is not a charac-
teristic of a developed economy. 3
Section 2 of the article outlines the historical development of
Chinese cultural traditions that made patents and other forms of
intellectual property virtually unthinkable. Section 3 discusses the
markedly unsuccessful attempts by foreigners to introduce intel-
lectual property regimes during the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, and by the Chinese themselves from the 1911 over-
throw of the last dynasty and advent of the Republic to the early
period of Communist rule in the 1950s. Section 4 examines de-
velopments aimed at modernizing the Chinese economy upon
emergence from the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution's economic,
political, and legal darkness, including those leading to enactment
of China's first modern patent law in 1985 and substantial
amendment in 1993.14 Section 5 examines today's Chinese patent
law, with a comparison between several of its major provisions
and their counterparts in the United States and other nations.
Section 6 evaluates recent evidence of both progress and problems
in the P.R.C.'s effort to sustain its commitment to develop (1) a
market economy, (2) a workable legal system based on the rule of
law, and (3) an effective patent system. We include in this discus-
sion a brief analysis of localism- a condition in some parts of
China characterized by city-level and province-level protection-
ism enforced by local officials in complicity with powerful cadres
of local business leaders and even a few locally stationed military
personnel- which emerged as a negative by-product of the
P.R.C.'s otherwise sound move to decentralize economic decision
making. We also take note of Chinese efforts to eliminate local-
3 Although beyond the scope of this article, the future path of China's
military is similarly very important because a belligerent path could certainly
hinder the nation's attractiveness to foreign investors and its full acceptance
into the international economic order. The stance of China's military depends,
of course, on the future control of P.R.C.'s civilian government over its mili-
tary and the government's decisions about how to use the military.
" See supra note 6.
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ism while retaining the benefits of decentralization."5 Siction 7
closes with summary comments and several concluding observa-
tions.
2. HISTORICAL ATTITUDES TOWARD INVENTION IN CHINA
As the oldest continuous civilization on Earth, the Chinese
have long been an exceptionally creative and inventive people. It
is well known that the Chinese invented countless items of utility
and novelty long before they were either reinvented or copied by
the West: including the decimal system, seismograph and com-
pass, guns and gunpowder, block type, movable type, paper, por-
celain, matches, and cast iron." Despite such a remarkable his-
tory of technological and creative enterprise, there is little if any
Chinese tradition of intellectual property."'
Chinese civilization can be traced at least to the tenty-first
century B.C., with the advent of the first dynasty, Xia.' Al-
though the first several dynasties did not completely consolidate
China into a nation-state, the imperial dynasties began to do so in
221 B.C. 9 The imperial dynastic period lasted until the over-
throw of the Qing dynasty and formation of the Republic of
China in 1911.20
1s Although localism should have the same negative effect on the devel-
opment of an effective patent system as on enforcement of copyright and
trademark laws, we deal with the problem and its attempted solution quite
sketchily because almost all of the evidence of the problem and its attempted
solution involve examples of copyright and trademark piracy rather than pat-
ent infringement. The simple reason is that copyright and trademark in-
fringement occur easily on a massive scale, and therefre, are more publicly
visible and widely reported. See infra at Section VIA.
's Other notable examples of very early Chinese inventions include a far
more efficient harness that, by not restricting a horse's breathing, permitted
one horse to pull the load that two or three horses using the European-
developed harness could pull, the wheelbarrow, the iron moldboard plow, the
helicopter rotor and propeller, the crossbow, and the distillation process for
alcohol. The blood circulation system also was discovered in China over 400
years before its usually attributed 1628 discovery by William Harvey. See Jo-
seph Needham, Science and China's Influence on the World, in THE LEGACY OF
CHiNA 234, 234-308 (Raymond Dawson ed., Oxford Univ. Press paperback
1971).
17 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 2.
18 FEDERAL RESEARCH DMSION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CHINA- A
COUNTRY STUDY 5 (Robert L. Worden et al. eds., 4th ed. 1988) [hereinafter
LOC, CHINA- A COUNTRY STUDY].
19 See id. at 11-13.
20 See id. at 29-30.
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Early Chinese laws on copying illuminate the way in which
ancient China regarded products of the intellect. Beginning early
in the imperial dynastic period, Chinese rulers issued decrees
criminalizing the copying of certain works, although these de-
crees could hardly be characterized as copyright in the modern
sense. The ruling groups had no apparent thought of either creat-
ing property-like rights in works or encouraging creative activ-
ity.21 In fact, when the work copied was not a writing by one of
the ancient philosophers, a government work considered to be
sensitive, or banned material such as pornography, copying was
seen as an important source of knowledge dissemination. Moreo-
ver, copying was viewed as a valuable link to the past in a society
in which past philosogphies and cultural norms served to legiti-
mize current practice.
Aside from government-sponsored works considered to be
sensitive and forbidden material, such as pornography,' the writ-
ings of the ancients were the most important works protected
from unauthorized copying.24 Sanctions were intended to place
the dissemination of ancient works under government control for
two purposes. First, Chinese leaders wished to control the beliefs
and ideas of the populace, especially the literate portion of the
populace, in order to preserve conformity and sociopolitical sta-
bility. Second, they wished to maintain the accuracy and ortho-
doxy of these works, which were vital to Chinese moral, social,
and legal structuresY.2  Although their ideas were not totally new
or original, the two dominant ancient writers, Confucius (or
Kong Zi) in the fifth and sixth centuries B.C. and Mencius (or
Meng Zi) in the third and fourth centuries B.C., largely developed
what came to be known as Confucianism.6 The dominance of
Confucian thinking in China influenced Chinese attitudes toward
21 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 9-10, 13.
2 See id. at 20-22.
2 See id. at 14-15.
24 See id.
25 See id. at 19-20; see also RUDI VOLTI, TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND
SOCIETY IN CHINA 18-19 (1982) (highlighting the historical importance of
Confucianism to Chinese civilization).
26 See, e.g., Brian Barron, Chinese Patent Legislation in Cultural and Histori-
cal Perspective, 6 INTELL. PROP. J. 313, 315-17 (1991) (noting that Confucius
drew partially upon the customs and philosophical writings of the early Zhou
dynasty (1027-221 B.C.), which antedated Confucius by approximately 300
years).
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products of the intellect. Its emphasis on personal development,
in contrast to personal gain, helped create a culture in which the
individual was viewed as quite important, but primarily so be-
cause of his or her contribution to society."7 The notion that
creative and inventive accomplishments could be the subject of
individual property rights was not simply foreign to their mode
of thinking, but was essentially beyond the scope of their mental
picture of the world. It was a mental picture painted with proto-
socialistic hues that shared many values with the later emergence
of a formally socialist economic system in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury.
28
Most of the evidence regarding traditional Chinese attitudes
toward copying relates to writings rather than devices and prod-
ucts for at least two reasons. First, the Chinese possessed tech-
nology for block type and then movable type hundreds of years
before Western nations, making it far easier to copy writings.
Second, in a twist on the idea of "who gets to write the history,"
the evidence of these attitudes is found in the works of early Chi-
nese historians and other writers who themselves were members
of the intellectual elite. This elite had a powerful literary orienta-
tion and disdained the mundane, such as practical physical inno-
vations.29 Although there are obviously historical records of the
startling degree of early Chinese inventiveness- otherwise we
would not know about it- reporting on devices and products
was simply not a priority for intellectuals whose writings now
serve as the primary evidence we have about Chinese history. It
is nonsensical to think, however, that deeply ingrained beliefs
about something as fundamental as the individual's role in soci-
2 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 10; Barron, supra note 26, at 316-20 (each
describing the place of the individual vis-a-vis society in Confucian thought).
21 Moreover, reverence for the philosophy of the ancients helped create an
isolationist attitude that prevailed or many centuries until the onset of intru-
sions from the West, which began in the seventeenth century and greatly in-
creased in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Chinese, believing that
their societal structure and norms could not be improved, were quite unrecep-
tive to ideas from outside. This same attitude probably accounts largely for the
fact that the many ingenious Chinese inventions were not disseminated beyond
China; those inventions finding their way to the West did so through extrac-
tion by Western visitors and not dispersion by the Chinese themselves. With
respect to commerce, however, Chinese responses to Western overtures
changed from totally unwelcome to mixed during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 30-31.
29 See VOLTI, supra note 25, at 20.21.
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ety- that products of the individual mind belong to society
rather than the individual- would extend only to literary prod-
ucts and not to physical ones.
The prevailing attitudes of the intellectual elite also may ex-
plain an extraordinary phenomenon. Although Chinese civiliza-
tion dominated the world in technology for many hundreds of
years, it ultimately fell far behind during the fifteenth century as
technological advancement all but ceased in China while it began
to flourish in the West. Astonishingly, the Chinese elite's domi-
nating influence on thought, with its disdain for the practical, as-
tonishingly led an entire nation to lose interest in technology." It
is unsurprising then that as patent laws began to emerge in the
West during the Renaissance no similar laws or even moral stric-
tures developed in China."
3. INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE PATENT PROTECTION
After much resistance, China began to engage in significant
foreign trade during the mid-eighteenth century. As trade in-
creased, foreign businesses and their home countries' governments
came to exert an accelerating amount of influence over Chinese
affairs. Beginning early in the nineteenth century, China lost
many aspects of its sovereignty to foreign powers after a series of
wars, which the Chinese were doomed to lose because they had
little in the way of military defense. 2 The most well-known con-
flict with a foreign power was the infamous Opium War in 1839-
1842." These losses led to the imposition of a number of "trea-
10 See id. at 21-22.
"' The Republic of Venice generally is credited with creating the first regu-
larized patent system in 1474. See, e.g., Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-
1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOCG' 166, 168-69 (1948); F. D. Prager, A History of In-
tellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 711, 712-15 (1944).
However, similar developments occurred contemporaneously in Genoa and
Florence. See F.D. Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Prop-
erty, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 106, 130-33 (1952).
32 See LOC, CHINA- A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 18, at 22-29.
"' The Opium War resulted from British purchases of opium and other
products from India, which the British then used for barter in China. The
Chinese continually condemned and outlawed the importation and use of
opium. When one Chinese leader seized and destroyed many tons of British
opium at a Chinese port, the British declared war and unsurprisingly won.
Out of the opium war came far more British and other foreign influence in
China (in addition to the ceding of Hong Kong to the British). See id. at 22-23.
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ties" on China that granted numerous trade concessions to foreign
powers.34
Moreover, China suffered from much internal strife during
this period that attracted even more foreign military involvement
and consequent foreign influence. Internal strife, catalyzed
mainly by popular dissatisfaction with rising foreign encroach-
ments and by the rapid decay of Qing, the last imperial dynasty,
ironically brought even more foreign involvement because the
Chinese government was able to quell internal uprisings primar-
ily due to foreign military assistance. The best known of these
events is the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, which actually resulted
from imperial reform efforts attempted much too late to be effec-
tive, and which prompted a revolt by those content with the
status quo. Although the cause of the Boxer Rebellion was the
opposite of other uprisings, the resulting increase in foreign influ-
ence was the same. A by-product of the Boxer Rebellion and
other instances of domestic rebellion was a far greater volume of
imports into China.36 This, in turn, precipitated increasing con-
cern by foreign entities and governments about protecting the in-
tellectual property associated with products exported to China.3
The resulting intellectual property agreements were not really
tested until the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The
first real intellectual property controversies concerned trade-
marks, as Chinese merchants began to use British trademarks in a
fashion that constituted infringement in the Western mind, al-
"4 See William Beaumont, The New Patent Law of the People's Republic of
China (PRC): Evidence of a Second Chinese "Renaissance?, 27 IDEA 39, 43 (1986).
" In 1898, the Qing emperor finally instituted a series of reforms aimed at
making sweeping social and institutional changes. The reforms covered a
broad range of subjects, including stamping out corruption, and remaking the
civil service system, legal system, defense establishment, and postal service.
Opposition to these reforms was intense among conservative groups, notably
among the group popularly known as the "Boxers." Their rebellion was
crushed by the Chinese, but only with the help of foreign military forces, lead-
ing to yet more concessions to and influence by foreign nations, including the
United States. See LOG, CHINA- A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 18, at 28-
29.
36 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 32-34; Tiefenbrun, supra note 8, at 11
(documenting the rise of exports and Western trade in China in the late nine-
teenth century).
" See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 32-34.
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though the Chinese themselves were unlikely to have had any
corresponding mental conception."
Of the various treaties over the last few centuries between
China and the United States, Britain, and Japan, only the 1903
treaty with the United States dealt with the development of a
Chinese patent system.39 The terms of the treaty called for China
to grant a limited term of patent protection to all American citi-
zens holding U.S. patents, assuming the product to be protected
was lawful to sell in China and did not copy previous inventions
of Chinese nationals.4" Because these treaty provisions ultimately
proved ineffective, the direction that full implementation might
have taken is unknown.
The last imperial dynasty finally fell in the 1911 Republican
Revolution that unsurprisingly led to a national governance struc-
ture bearing scant resemblance to a true republic.41 In 1912, the
Chinese government adopted a patent law providing protection
only for the inventions of Chinese nationals. Over the next 30
years, fewer than one thousand patents were granted to Chinese
subjects.42 Confucian thought still had a meaningful influence on
individual and government behavior at this time, although a de-
crepit legal and administrative structure was at least as much to
blame for the failure of this weak effort.43 It was not until 1923
that the patent protection afforded Chinese subjects in 1912 was
extended to American patent holders as China had promised in
1903. 4 This amendment failed as well because of the usual ab-
sence of meaningful implementation efforts, and it was observed
in 1924 by an American diplomat in China that Chinese in-
fringement of U.S. patents was widespread.4"
38 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 8, at 11.
3 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 37.
40 The 1903 Sino-U.S. treaty also covered copyrights, specifying that Chi-
nese nationals would enjoy the protection of U.S. copyright law to the same
extent that China had agreed to protect U.S. copyrights. The vagueness and
lack of implementation measures of the copyright and trademark provisions
rendered them virtually impotent. See id. at 38.
41 See LOC, CHINA- A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 18, at 29-30.
42 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 4142.
" See Barron, supra note 26, at 322-24.
44 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 4142.
41 See NORMAN ALLMAN, TRADEMARK PROTEcTION 96 (1924), cited in
ALFORD, supra note 10, at 43 (discussing several forms of intellectual property).
One must realize that a patent system and even an operable legal system, were
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After almost two decades of factionalism, the Guomindang
party gained power in 1928.46 The Guomindang enacted a copy-
right law in 1928 that was patterned after Germany's but with
evident Japanese influences." The law did little to protect works
of foreign origin.48 A trademark law followed in 1930, and a pat-
ent law in 1932."9 Like the 1912 statute, the 1932 patent law pro-
vided protection for inventions of Chinese nationals but not for
foreign inventors, even if the latter held a U.S. or other foreign-
origin patent."0 It is notable that after several decades of neglect,
Chinese science enjoyed a significant renaissance during the 1920s
and 1930S.5' Because of the patent system's almost complete inef-
fectuality, one cannot know whether the scientific renewal gener-
ated potentially patentable inventions. Civil conflict between
1937 and World War II, followed by Japanese domination during
the war, stifled the nascent resurgence of scientific and technical
learning.5 2
It is well-known that fighting between Communists and Na-
tionalists intensified in the 1945-1949 period. In what can only be
characterized as a true oddity, shortly before losing to the Com-
munists and fleeing to Taiwan in 1949, the Nationalists enacted a
sweeping law that not only extended the 1932 patent law to pro-
tect foreign-origin inventions, depending on reciprocity, but also
adopted almost every type of patent provision in other nations'
patent systems, with little attention to whether they fit into a co-
hesive whole. 3 Excluded from the definition of patentable sub-
without precedent in Chinese history. The Chinese seemed to equate formal
enactment with actual implementation when the two are obviously creatures
of quite different colors. A similar scene with a bizarre twist was played in
several of China's provinces, where patent laws were enacted for provincial
residents; these so-called patents, however, granted rewards to those who suc-
cessfully imitated foreign inventions and put them to use in the province. See
id.
46 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 50.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 50-51.
49 See id. at 51-52.
5 As in the past, despite any merits of the patent law itself, its effective
operability was essentially foreclosed by an antiquated legal system in general,
and by a legal system completely incapable of dealing with patents in particu-
lar. See id. at 50-53.
51 See LOC, CHNA- A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 18, at 376-77.
52 See id.
51 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 52.
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ject matter were chemicals, food, and pharmaceuticals; these ex-
clusions were carried over to China's first truly modern patent
law in 1985 and were not removed until the 1993 amendments. 4
The 1949 patent act, like those preceding it, was adopted either
on the mistaken assumption that there was an underlying admin-
istrative and legal structure to make it work, or with little aware-
ness that such a foundation was essential.55 Thus, there would
have been no change in actual practice even if the Communists
had not taken control of mainland China shortly after the law
was enacted.
Even prior to the Communist formation of the People's Re-
public of China (P.R.C.) in 1949, the Communists had for several
decades created Soviet-like systems in the areas they controlled. 6
Thus, when the newly ensconced P.R.C. invalidated all Republi-
can laws, it was a fairly logical and easy step for it to adopt intel-
lectual property laws based on the Soviet model. Moreover, the
Soviet socialist model comported with longstanding Confucian
traditions that inventions and other creations were social activi-
ties, the results of which belonged to all members of society. 7
Part of the rationale for this attitude, both in Confucianism and
later in communist socialism, was that all such inventions and
creations drew heavily on a preexisting repository of knowledge. 8
While it is axiomatic that all inventions and other creations draw
from the work of predecessors, the Western implementation of
this notion has tended strongly toward encouraging and reward-
ing those who make meaningful, even if incremental, improve-
ments to what has gone before them. The Chinese implementa-
tion of this axiom led to an essentially opposite result.
The P.R.C.'s initial efforts to create a patent system consisted
of provisional regulations in 1950 adopting the Soviet "two-track"
approach.' The law's "first track" discouraged creation of prop-
14 See id. at 52, 72, 115.
s5 See id. at 53.
56 See id. at 56; S. NAZRE-HYDER, TECHNOLOGY & SKILL FORMATION:
THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE, 1953-75 2-3 (detailing the Soviet method of patent
protection and the modifications made to it in China).
17 See Harrington, supra note 7, at 341-42.
58 See id.; Tiefenbrun, supra note 8, at 11.
s See NAZRE-HYDER, supra note 56, at 3-4. See generally David Ben Kay,
Comment, The Patent Law of the People's Republic of China in Perspective, 33
UCLA L. REV. 331, 340-56 (1985) (describing the evolution of Chinese patent
law).
1999]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. . Intl Econ. L.
erty ownership in the invention, but instead called for the award
of "certificates of invention" to creators of notable inventions.
Such a certificate provided public recognition to the inventor and
a modest monetary reward representing a percentage of produc-
tion costs saved as a result of the invention's use over a one-year
period.61 The government held ownership of the intangible prop-
erty rights in the invention and the corresponding right to exploit
and disseminate it.62 Chinese subjects inventing as part of their
work for a state-owned enterprise, which characterized almost all
inventors of the period, could receive no more than a certificate
of invention.63
The patent law's "second track" provided for issuance of a true
patent to the inventor, carrying with it the right to receive royal-
ties from the invention's use." Only those inventing outside the
course of their employment for a state-owned enterprise, those
inventing within the few private enterprises (the number of
which was rapidly declining at this time), and foreign nationals
inventing on their own within China were eligible to receive such
patents.65 However, even those few inventions eligible for a pat-
ent were subject to state confiscation, entitling the inventor only
to a certificate, if the government determined that the invention
"concerned national security, or 'affected the welfare of the great
majority of the people.' 66 Thus, even those inventors who were
eligible for a patent were unlikely to receive one if the invention
was important.
Although the P.R.C.'s 1950 patent regulations were closely
patterned after the Soviet Union's, the P.R.C.'s motives in adopt-
ing the two-track system were different. The Soviets held out the
possibility, although a rather remote one, of true patent protec-
tion in order to assuage the fears of multinational companies
upon whom it depended for trade and generation of hard cur-
' See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 57-58; Kay, supra note 59, at 340-56.
61 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 57; Kay, supra note 59, at 346.
62 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 57-58.
63 See id. at 58.
" See id.
65 See id.
66 Id.; see also Barron, supra note 26, at 326; Beaumont, supra note 34, at 45.
See generally Kay, supra note 59, at 340-56. Each of these authorities outlines
the situations in which only a certificate of inventorship was available to the
inventor.
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rency.6" The Chinese, on the other hand, held out the similarly
remote possibility of receiving a real patent in order to placate in-
tellectuals and those still holding large property interests because
the P.R.C.'s infant government viewed their participation as nec-
essary to rebuild the country internally." Needless to say, the
P.R.C.'s early effort did not produce anything approaching a
workable patent system.
Unsurprisingly, the P.R.C.'s 1950 patent regulations did not
create enthusiasm among those in the scientific and engineering
communities. Even with an improved reward structure for re-
cipients of inventors' certificates in 1954, by 1958 the P.R.C. pat-
ent law had produced but six certificates and four patents.69 Po-
litical fermentation in the late 1950s and early 1960s, including
the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957 and the Great Leap Forward
in 1958-60, produced rather quickly a poisonous atmosphere not
only for those favoring a workable patent system but also for all
of Chinese scientific and inventive enterprise.7' These precursors
of the scientifically devastating Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976
began to cast all intellectuals, including scientists and inventors, as
subversive to the cause of communist socialism.7' The use of ma-
terial incentives to encourage inventive and creative efforts was
rejected in 1962, and scientists and other intellectuals were con-
demned for emphasizing professional development over the ideals
of the Communist Party.72 No patents or invention certificates
were issued in the 1958-1963 period.73 In 1963, the communist
government dumped patents and other rewards for invention into
67 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 58; Kay, supra note 59, at 343-44.
6 One noteworthy characteristic of the early P.R.C. efforts to recognize
intellectual property is that the new government placed much greater emphasis
on inventions and technology than on trademark and copyright. The reverse
had been true of late-imperial and republican efforts. See generally ALFORD,
supra note 10, at 50-51, 58-59 (discussing how the first intellectual property law
passed by the Guomindang was the copyright law, while under the 1950 regu-
lations "relatively greater attention [was] focused on inventions").
69 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 61.
70 See Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and Patent Law in the People's Re-
public of China, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 259, 263 (1986).
71 See id. at 263-64.
2 See John Wong, Appropriate Technology and Development, ERC
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 9 (1980).
1 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 62.
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a landfill of progressive ideas where they remained for the next
twenty years.74
The environment for science and technology degenerated rap-
idly. During the infamous Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976,
various rationales were espoused to denigrate the work of scien-
tists, inventors, creators, and intellectuals in general. Because
they were considered a subversive element, they had to abandon
their careers to engage in agricultural work and other physical
tasks for which they were untrained and totally unsuited.75 Sci-
ence, engineering, and most other intellectual inquiries came to a
standstill, and what was left of the nation's legal system was de-
stroyed, causing negative repercussions that are yet to be fully
rectified. Although the arrest and conviction of the so-called
"Gang of Four" in 1976 marked the official termination of the
Cultural Revolution, real change was a gradual process that actu-
ally began a few years prior to 1976.6
4. ECONOMIC AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEVELOPMENTS
FROM THE BEGINNINGS OF POST-MAO REFORM TO
CHINA'S FIRST MODERN PATENT LAW
Chinese leaders following Mao's demise evidenced not only
greater foresight but also greater pragmatism in their vision of
China's economic future. They viewed scientific and technologi-
cal advancement as crucial to the building of a modern economy
that could recognize individual achievements to the greatest ex-
tent possible without undermining socialism's fundamental ten-
ets.' These leaders targeted as high priorities the redevelopment
of higher education, the all-but-destroyed legal system, intellectual
property, and intellectual pursuits in general. 78 In 1978, the post-
' See Sidel, supra note 70, at 280-82.
75 See NAZRE-HYDER, supra note 56, at 10; Kay, supra note 59, at 350.
76 See Sidel, supra note 70, at 264 (noting that although the Cultural Revo-
lution generally is thought to have extended to 1976, the year of Mao Zedong 's
death, it actually began to fracture before then because there were other Chi-
nese leaders, such as Zhou Enlai and Den? Xiaoping, with far greater acuity
than Mao who had begun to take power from him in the 1970s as his healt
deteriorated); Kay, supra note 59, at 351 (detailing the death of Mao Zedong
and the end of the Cultural Revolution).
' See Sidel, supra note 70, at 281.
78 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 65.
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Mao P.R.C. reinstated formal honors and pecuniary rewards for
technological achievement."
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing through the 1980s,
China's leaders recognized as a first principle that an economy
based even partly on market principles required significant decen-
tralization of economic decision making.80 Leaders of this era also
understood that fundamental contract, property, and similar laws
were necessary for a market economy or a mixed market-socialist
economy to function. P.R.C. functionaries of this period debated
and ultimately enacted a large body of law and implemented regu-
lations with the aim of creating a legal system that would support
an economy based on market incentives while retaining the basic
principles of socialism.81 Accomplishing such a feat is self-
evidently difficult. The main results of these efforts were a new
constitution in 1982 and a great deal of economic legislation
aimed at assuaging foreign business fears and thus attracting
greater foreign investment.
82
One of the most intense debates during the late 1970s and
early 1980s concerned patent legislation. Opponents viewed the
creation of private property rights in inventions as fundamentally
polar to the ideals of socialism." Proponents observed that ap-
proximately 130 nations had comprehensive patent laws, includ-
ing all nations viewed as more prosperous than China.84 Ulti-
mately, movement toward an effective patent system required the
continued encouragement of Deng Xiaoping himself.8" Deng and
other proponents argued that creation of a patent system would
79 See id.
80 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, Regulation and Its Discontents: Understanding
Economic Law in China, 28 STAN. J. INTIL L. 283, 285-86 (1992); Robb M.
LaKritz, Comment, Taming a 5,000 Year-Old Dragon: Toward a Theory of Legal
Development in Post-Mao China, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 237, 256 (1997);
Mark C. Lewis, Contract Law in the People's Republic of China- Rule or Tool:
Can the PR Cs Foreign Economic Contract Law be Administered According to the
Rule of Law?, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495, 503 (1997).
81 See Sidel, supra note 70, at 281.
82 See id. at 282.
83 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 8, at 18.
84 Lulin, supra note 4, at 9 (noting that, at the time of his writing, more
than 100 countries were signatories to the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), nearly 30 others complied with
its provisions, and these countries together accounted for over 90% of world
trade volume).
85 See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 69.
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(1) assuage foreign fears and thus encourage foreign investment in
China, including the creation of a climate that would bring more
foreign technology into China, (2) provide an additional stimulus
to new scientific and engineering research within China, which
had already been targeted as one of the keys to modernizing
China's economy, (3) encourage more exchanges of science and
technology information among Chinese researchers because pat-
ents would be published and made systematically accessible, and
(4) open up possibilities for China's membership in several inter-
national organizations, such as the United Nations' World Intel-
lectual Property Organization ('WIPO"), that could bring many
side-benefits to the nation.86
Under Deng Xiaoping's direction, a patent law drafting com-
mittee began an exceptionally thorough three-year effort to learn
as much as possible about the world's patent systems. Many Chi-
nese, especially those with technical education, were sent to study
the patent systems of developed nations such as the United States,
Japan, and West Germany, and even to some socialist countries
considered by China to be prosperous such as Yugoslavia. 7 The
drafting committee also acquired and translated the patent laws of
more than thirty countries.8 After almost two dozen drafts, the
committee presented to the People's Congress proposed legisla-
tion for a patent system based largely on the German model.
Once in the People's Congress, it was substantially amended be-
fore enactment by those with little of the knowledge or experi-
ence of those on the drafting committee.8 9
The 1985 Chinese patent law and accompanying regulations
that emerged from this process embodied the almost universal
patentability requirements of utility, novelty, and inventiveness
("nonobviousness" in the United States)." It also recognized the
distinction observed in many nations between regular patents
("utility patents" in the United States and "invention patents" in
86 See id.
87 See id.; see also Harrington, supra note 7, at 345.
8' See ALFORD, supra note 10, at 69.
89 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 8, at 17.
o See Kay, supra note 59, at 352-53, 360. The non-obviousness require-
ment in U.S. patent law is found at 35 U.S.C. S 103 (1994).
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China), and "utility models," which are a form of petty-patent not
recognized in the United States.9'
Several intrinsic problems rendered the 1985 patent law
largely illusory. One problem is that it clearly favored foreign
entities over Chinese subjects. 92 For example, Chinese subjects
could apply for patents only if they produced the invention either
completely on their own or while working for a non-state-owned
enterprise, which effectively precluded all Chinese subjects from
eligibility at the time.93 Thus, they were eligible only for utility
models and relatively modest monetary rewards, hardly the in-
centive structure envisioned by Deng."4
While the 1985 law clearly gave the advantage to foreign enti-
ties in receiving invention patents, it also made many empty
promises to all, including foreigners. For example, its fifteen-year
term, counted from the first priority filing date, disadvantaged
not only Chinese subjects, who had limited access to the trained
professionals necessary to institute the patent application process,
but also foreign entities, who had to deal with foreign application
priority dates, translation costs, and the severely underdeveloped
Chinese patent administrative structure.95
Additionally, the 1985 law's substantive coverage was defi-
cient in several respects when compared with international patent
norms. Foremost among these deficiencies was the law's exclu-
sion of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and most agricultural prod-
ucts from the definition of patentable subject matter. 6 These ex-
91 The United States does not recognize utility models, or "petty-patents"
as they are characterized in some countries. Such grants generally apply to
relatively minor improvement on current technology. They are not examined
in the relevant patent office for novelty and nonobviousness (or "inventive-
ness"), but are subjected to only a facial examination to ensure that the applica-
tion and other relevant filing documents meet statutory requirements. That is,
it is simply a registration process similar to copyright registration. A number
of highly developed nations, including Japan and Germany, do recognize util-
ity models. See id. at 361-62.
92 See id. at 359.
93 See Beaumont, supra note 34, at 48.
94 See id.
9' See Sidel, supra note 70, at 285-86.
96 See id. at 283-84 (explaining that under the 1985 patent law food, bever-
ages, flavorings, and animal and plant varieties were not patentable, whereas
microorganisms and "processes used in producing" them were patentable).
Pharmaceuticals and processes were excluded from the 1984 law and then in-
cluded in the 1992 amendments. See Kay, supra note 59, at 364; J. Michael
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clusions directly disadvantaged foreign patent holders because sci-
entists achieving patentable innovations in these areas were work-
ing in many countries, but certainly not in China.97 The Chinese
and their economy suffered from these exclusions as well, al-
though somewhat less directly. If foreign patent owners could
not receive protection in China, the Chinese had little or no law-
ful access to products in these categories.
At least as important as the substantive deficiencies in the
1985 law was the continuing absence of an adequate administra-
tive and legal structure to implement and enforce it. One must
keep in mind that China is a country without a tradition of gov-
ernance by law; its comprehensive attempts to create a formal le-
gal system and laws governing commerce began only in 1979.9
There were few lawyers, few judges with adequate training, and
few people in the patent area with both technical and patent law
knowledge to make a modern patent system operable.99 Al-
though significant progress is being made, this systemic problem
continues to plague Chinese modernization efforts today."°
5. TODAY'S CHINESE PATENT SYSTEM
Despite initial positive reactions to the enactment of the 1985
patent law, U.S. companies trying to enter the Chinese market
quickly recognized its many problems and continually voiced
their concerns during the next several years. Hearing and verify-
ing their concerns, the U.S. government communicated to the
P.R.C. its dissatisfaction with the state of patent and other intel-
lectual property protection for U.S. entities doing business with
china." In 1991, after negotiations with China failed to produce
Warner & Han Xiaoqing, The Chinese System ofAdministrative Protection For
Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. MARsHALL L. REV. 1165, 1168 (1998).
' See generally Warner & Xiaoqing, supra note 96, at 1168.
9' See Barron, supra note 26, at 328.
99 See Intellectual Property Rights: China's Stance Toward Protection, BEIJING
REV., Jan. 16-22, 1995, at 8 (interviewing Song Jian, State Councilor and Minis-
ter of the State Science and Technology Commission of China, who noted that
Chinese protection began later than other countries but that in the last few
years the judicial and law enforcement system has been enhanced in an effort
to secure implementation of the laws).
100 See infra Section 6.5.
101 U.S. trade officials estimated that the total annual loss because of Chi-
nese industrial piracy and patent infringement had reached nearly $400 million
by 1991. See Harrington, supra note 7, at 357.
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an accord satisfactory to the United States, the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative threatened China with the imposition of increased du-
ties on $1.5 billion worth of Chinese imports to the United
States. 2 These negotiations led to a 1992 Sino-American Memo-
randum of Understanding ('MOU"). °3  In the MOU, China
committed itself not only to a number of substantive patent law
changes, but also to the creation of an administrative and legal
structure for the examination and enforcement of patents, using
decision-makers with both relevant technical and patent law
knowledge."° The MOU led to substantial amendments to
China's patent law, which became effective on January 1, 199305
As noted, the 1985 patent act and its 1993 amendments are
based primarily on the German model. Therefore, the Chinese
Patent Law reflects European patent systems more than the
American system. Despite the movement toward market eco-
nomics, the Chinese economy still remains under ultimate state
control, and thus China's patent law diverges in some respects
from both European and American models in order to accommo-
date its peculiar economic context. 6 Several of the key features
of the Chinese system after the 1993 amendments are listed and
briefly discussed below.
(1) Like all the world's patent laws, except for those of the
United States, priority between two individuals or entities both
contending that they are entitled to a patent on the same inven-
tion depends on who first files a patent application."0 The
United States retains its first-to-invent priority system."' How-
102 See id. at 358. The U.S. Trade Representative acted under authority
granted in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which, inter
alia, amended the 1974 Trade Act. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. %§ 2411-2420 (1994)).
103 Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Prop-
erty, Jan. 17, 1992, U.S.-P.R.C., 34 I.L.M. 676 [hereinafter 1992 MOU].
1C4 See Harrington, supra note 7, at 358.
105 See id. at 359.
106 See, e.g., P.R.C. Patent Law, supra note 2, art. 10 (stating that a Chinese
patent cannot be assigned to a foreign entity without approval by the Chinese
government).
107 See id. art. 9. See generally Gao Lulin, On the Revision of the Current
Patent Law in China, CHINA PAT. & TRADEMARK Q., Oct. 1992, at 7; Ross J.
Oehler, Patent Law In The People's Republic of China: A Primer, 8 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. INTL & COMP. L. 451, 458-59 (1987) (outlining priority rights granted to
holders of foreign applications for inventions and designs).
'08 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).
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ever, in the U.S. system the first inventor to file has such a major
advantage over one who claims that he was actually the first to
invent, although not the first to file, that our priority system
closely approaches a defacto first-to-file praxis.'
(2) Chemical, pharmaceutical, and agricultural products gen-
erally became patentable in 1993.110 The 1985 law's exclusion of
these classes of inventions had been a serious concern of the
United States that was addressed in the 1992 MOU.11'
(3) The term of protection for invention patents was extended
from fifteen to twenty years from the date of filing, and the term
for utility models and design patents was extended from five to
ten years." 2 The new terms conform to international norms, al-
109 When this type of conflict occurs, the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office ("USPTO") declares an "interference," which is an adversarial pro-
ceeding conducted by the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
("BPAI"). See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1994). A discussion of patent interferenceprac-
tice is far beyond the scope of this article. Briefly, however, the first to ile is
called the senior party and the second to file, who also claims first invention, is
the junior party. See 37 C.F.R. S1.601 (1998). Of the total number of patent
applications filed annually in the USPTO, an extremely small percentage of
them provoke interferences, and of those, the junior party wins an extremely
small percentage of the time. The junior party can cause the USPTO to de-
clare an interference and seek to overcome its junior status in several different
ways. See id. The upshot of all of this, however, is that an interference is de-
clared in a tiny percentage of applications filed with the USPTO, and junior
parties win interferences a tiny percentage of the times they are declared.
Thus, although one should not make too much of the fact that the United
States is alone in the world in having a first-to-invent system, a number of peo-
ple who should know better do make much of it. See Li Cang, The Similarities
and Dissimilarities Between the Patent Laws of PRC & USA, CHINA PAT. &
TRADEMARK Q., July 1987, at 32, 33 (discussing advantages of filing first in the
United States); Franklin Pierce Law Center's Sixth Biennial Patent System Major
Problems Conference, 37 IDEA 623, 673 (1997) (observing that interferences are
rarely declared and when declared, they are rarely won by the junior party).
Moreover, in addition to giving the advantage in an interference to the first
filer, U.S. patent law includes many other provisions that make it very impor-
tant for an inventor to file an application as early as possible. These provisions
are found primarily in 35 U.S.C. SS 102(a) (relating to novelty), 102(b) (relating
to the so-called "statutory bars" caused by making a public use of the invention
or placing it on sale more than one year before filing the application), and 103
(relating to the requirement that the invention must have been non-obvious to
an ordinarily skilled person in the relevant area of expertise at the time of in-
vention).
11 See P.R.C. Patent Law, supra note 2, art. 25 (excluding chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, and agricultural products from list of patentable subject mat-
ter).
111 See Warner & Xiaoqing, supra note 96, at 1169-71.
112 See P.R.C. Patent Law, supra note 2, art. 45; Lulin, supra note 107, at 9.
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though at that time and until 1995, the United States retained its
longstanding term of seventeen years from the time the patent
was granted.113 TRIPS' accompanied the 1994 Uruguay Round
of GATT negotiations mandates at least a twenty-year term for
invention patents and ten-year terms for utility models and design
patents. 5 Although China is not a member of the WTO created
by the Uruguay Round, it clearly wishes to be; this desire is dem-
onstrated by its change to a twenty-year patent term well before
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (and before the United
States changed its patent term).
(4) As in most patent systems, Chinese law after 1993 pro-
vides for publication of the patent application eighteen months
after filing." 6 Under the 1985 act, the Chinese Patent Office
("CPO") could publish the application at any time during the
eighteen-month period after filing, thus giving the applicant no
assurance that the contents of the application would remain secret
after filing."' Today, there is such assurance of confidentiality
during the eighteen months after filing."' The United States is
one of the world's few nations that does not publish patent appli-
cations; publication occurs only after the patent issues." 9 There
currently is serious debate, including proposed legislation, regard-
ing the institution of an eighteen-month patent application publi-
cation in the United States. However, the issue is mainly impor-
tant in the United States to independent inventors and small
businesses who do not plan to file for patents in other nations.1 0
113 Effective June 8, 1995, the U.S. patent term changed to the interna-
tional norm of 20 years from the first U.S. filing date. See 35 U.S.C. S 154(a)(2)
(1994); see also Luhin, supra note 107, at 9.
114 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
"' See id. arts. 33, 38.
116 See Harrington, supra note 7, at 365.
117 See MICHAEL PENDLETON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 32 (1986).
... See Harrington, supra note 7, at 365.
119 See Cang, supra note 109, at 33.
120 See id. As of this writing, however, the latest legislative proposal in
Congress for changing the U.S. patent system in several ways aims to require
publication of applications for U.S. patents 18 months after filing only for
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Larger entities or individuals seeking additional patent protection
in nations outside the United States must realize that their patent
applications will be published in those other countries eighteen
months after filing.121 Thus, U.S. patent applicants who intend to
also seek foreign patents already face eighteen-month publica-
tions. A change in U.S. practice, however, would mean that a
competitor or other party interested in the content of a U.S. pat-
ent application published eighteen months after filing would im-
mediately have access to it in English, rather than being faced
with the time and expense of translating after its publication in
another country such as Japan, Germany, or France. One could
argue, then, that the United States' emulation of China's and
other nations' eighteen-month application publication system
would enable U.S. companies to gain quicker access to technical
innovations in non-English speaking countries.
(5) The 1993 amendments eliminated the pre-grant opposition
procedure that unduly delayed patent issuance and thus dimin-
ished the term of protection. Like its U.S. counterpart, the new
law requires that the patent be issued upon favorable completion
of the substantive examination process. Within six months of
issuance, anyone wishing to challenge the validity of the patent
may do so in an administrative proceeding before the CPO."2
After six months, challengers instituting post-grant oppositions
must do so before China's Patent Reexamination Board."'
(6) In American patent law, inventors enjoy a one-year "grace
period," which essentially means that once the complete inven-
tion has been either (a) publicly disclosed or used (which includes
almost any non-secret disclosure or use) or (b) offered for sale by
either the inventor or someone else, a patent application must be
filed within one year or the right to patent is lost."2 China, how-
ever, has followed the model found in almost all other nations.
those also filed in a foreign country. See H.R. 1907, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. S
402-08 (1999).
121 See id.
'22 See P.R.C. Patent Law, supra note 2, art. 39; see also Harrington, supra
note 7, at 366.
" See P.R.C. Patent Law, supra note 2, art. 41; see also Harrington, supra
note 7, at 366.
124 See P.R.C. Patent Law, supra note 2, art. 48; see also Harrington, supra
note 7, at 367.
125 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); see also Cang, supra note 109, at 33.
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Except for disclosure under specified exceptional circumstances,
there is no grace period.126 Thus, in most cases, a public use or
disclosure of the invention or the act of placing it on sale before
application immediately destroys the right to obtain a patent.
This feature, which is the international norm, is often referred to
as a requirement of "absolute novelty.""v
(7) In the United States, it is a common practice for a patent
owner (especially a large company) to hold the patent without
making, using, or selling the patented invention; instead, the pat-
ent owner will use the patent defensively, either alone to block
rivals.from practicing the specific technology or as part of a large
patent portfolio to fence out rivals from an entire area of tech-
nology. 28 Similarly, a company holding a large patent portfolio
may treat it as a dormant asset by sitting on it for several years,
waiting for others to intentionally or unintentionally use some of
its patented technology, threatening to file or actually filing an in-
fringement suit, and settling by licensing and collecting royal-
ties.129 Patentees in the United States can do so because American
126 See P.R.C. Patent Law, supra note 2, art. 24 (granting a six-month grace
period if disclosure of the invention was made (1) by exhibiting it at a P.R.C.-
sponsored international exhibition, (2) at a P.R.C.-approved academic or tech-
nological meeting, or (3) without the consent of the patent applicant, as in a
situation where the technology was misappropriated while it was still a trade
secret, then disclosed by the misappropriator); see also Cang, supra note 109, at
33.
12 See id. at 33.
128 See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 451-52 (2d ed. 1980) (noting the problem of "de-
fensive" patenting and its probable anti-competitive effects in the United
States).
129 Some companies, such as Texas Instruments and Motorola, have be-
come true masters of this art, often generating more revenues from royalties on
otherwise dormant patents than they generate from operations. IBM and other
companies do likewise, although their operating revenues are so large that they
are not outdistanced by royalty income. See Andrew M. Riddles et al., Start-Up
Companies Should Devise IP Strategies, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at C7; see also
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Liti-
gated Patents, 26 AIPLA Qj. 185, 189 & n.5, 237 & n.96 (inferring from sev-
eral empirical findings, plus Wesley M. Cohen et al., Appropriability Conditions
and Why Firms Patent and Why They Do Not in the American Manufacturing Sec-
tor (April 17-18, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Stanford
Workshop on Intellectual Property and Industry Competitive Standards, Stan-
ford Law School), that patenting for defensive purposes is likely to be one of
the primary factors motivating the increase in patenting activity, even as re-
search and development executives see patenting as not being one of the best
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patent law does not grant an affirmative right, but instead grants
an exclusive right to the patentee to exclude others from making,
using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented inven-
tion.3 ' In most other countries, a patent owner, regardless of the
nation of his or her domicile, cannot use his or her patent solely
for defensive purposes. Instead, the owner typically must either
put the patented invention into practice or license another to do
so within a specified period of time or within a "reasonable time";
otherwise, the patentee can be compelled to grant nonexclusive
reasonable-royalty licenses to other entities.13' Moreover, in the
United States, one who obtains a patent on an improvement to an
already-patented invention cannot make any use of the improve-
ment patent without obtaining a license from the owner of the
earlier, dominant patent. 3 2 Although licensing, especially cross-
licensing, is a very common way of resolving this type of block-
ing problem in the United States, it cannot be compelled.'33 The
compulsory licensing provisions in most other patent systems
also provide for compulsory licensing in this dominant-
subservient patent scenario.' Again reflecting the hybridization
resulting from an attempt to fit a modern patent system within
the context of an emerging market economy that remains under
ultimate state control, China's patent law provides for compul-
sory licensing in the two situations described but also includes an
idiosyncracy- its compulsory licensing provision can be trig-
gered merely by another entity's denied request for a license on
means of appropriating returns on their companies' research and development
investment).
130 See 35 U.S.C. S 154(a)(1) (1994).
13 See, e.g., JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
S 3.03[1][a], 3.03[2][a] (1999) (discussing that compulsory licensing for the
non-working patent is common outside the United States, but the practical
effect may not begreat because these laws do not require the patentee to li-
cense also ancillary "know-how" that is often critical for a licensee's effective
use of a patent).
132 See id.
133 See id. § 6.05, at 6-55 (noting the common use in the United States of
cross-licensing to resolve blocking-patent problems, and that in this situation
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice views cross-licensing as
pro-competitive).
134 See, e.g., Mark F. Wachter, Patent Enforcement in Japan: An American
Perspective for Success, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 59, 67 (1991) (observingthat compulsory
licensing is used to resolve the dominant-subservient patent blocking problem
in the Japanese patent system).
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reasonable terms as long as the requester can demonstrate the ca-
pability to exploit the patent.13
(8) Like the majority of countries with developed patent sys-
tems, 136 the Chinese law recognizes "prior user rights" as a defense
to patent infringement. In the United States, which does not rec-
ognize prior user rights, the following scenario may occur. An
entity that first invented a patentable technology elects to use
trade secret protection rather than seek a patent. This is an espe-
cially attractive alternative in the case of an internally used proc-
ess, which is when the scenario normally arises. Another com-
pany later develops the same technology independently13 and
patents it. If the earlier inventor had used his or her technology
in a non-secret manner, such use would bar the later inventor
from acquiring a patent because the earlier non-secret use would
be viewed as a "public use" constituting "prior art" that destroys
the novelty of the later invention. 138  Because the first inventor
kept its technology confidential, however, the later inventor may
not only patent it but also may hold the earlier inventor liable for
patent infringement or settle the infringement claim by forcing
the earlier inventor to buy a license and pay royalties.139 Unlike
the United States, but like most other countries, China's patent
law recognizes prior user rights by giving the earlier inventor a
defense against the later inventor's infringement claim.1
135 See P.R.C. Patent Law, supra note 2, arts. 51 (the compulsory license),
56 (license is nonexclusive and nonassignable), 57 (requiring payment by licen-
see to patent owner of a reasonable royalty which, if not successfully negoti-
ated, is set by CPO adjudication); see also Implementing Regulations of the Pat-
ent Law of the People's Republic of China, arts. 68, 69, reprinted in 2 CHINA L.
FOR FOREIGN Bus. (CCI) (1993) (providing more detail on license requester's
proof of ability to exploit the patent as a prerequisite to receiving a compul-
sory license) [hereinafter P.R.C. Patent Regulations].
136 See, e.g., Keith M. Kupferschmid, Prior User Rights: The Inventor's Lot-
tery Ticket, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 213, 251-53 (1993) (analyzing prior user rights as of
1993 in 48 countries, finding that only 10 of the 48 had no provision for prior
user rights- the United States was one of the 10 and continues to eschew prior
user rights).
137 The later inventor cannot obtain a patent if it learned of the technology
from the earlier inventor or someone else. See 35 U.S.C. 5 102( (1994) (stating
that an applicant may not obtain a U.S. patent if "he did not himself invent the
subject matter sought to be patented").
138 See 35 U.S.C. S 102(a) (1994).
139 See Kupferschmid, supra note 136, at 219 n.17.
"4 See P.R.C. Patent Law, supra note 2, art. 62(3). Also, like other coun-
tries with prior user rights, China limits the defense to the scope of the earlier
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(9) One rather unexpected move by the Chinese was that
they adopted a requirement that exists in U.S. patent law but is
rarely found in the rest of the world. A universal requirement in
all patent laws is that the patent application include a sufficiently
complete and precise written description, with drawings, that
would enable one reasonably skilled in the area of technology
("the art") to make and use the invention without having to en-
gage in undue experimentation beyond studying the description.
This is generally referred to as the "enablement" requirement."'
In the same sentence in U.S. law, however, a clause imposes an
additional disclosure obligation typically referred to as the "best
mode" requirement. It provides that, in addition to fulfilling the
enablement requirement that places the invention generally in the
hands of the relevantly skilled portion of the public, the applicant
also must disclose the "best mode contemplated by the inventor
[at the time of application] of carrying out his invention."1 2 The
term "mode" refers to a method of implementation, and the pat-
ent application obviously must disclose at least one mode for the
disclosure to be enabling. The best mode requirement further re-
quires that if, when the inventor filed the application, he or she
had in mind a mode of implementation that was better than all
other known alternatives (sometimes called the "preferred em-
inventor's use as of the time the later inventor files its patent application. See
id. As with 18-month publication, recognition of prior user rights in the
United States has been hotly debated for several years. The patent law revi-
sions in recent years, as well as the current bill, call for institution in the
United States of prior user rights (in the current bill, called "first inventor
rights" in a politically astute semantic maneuver). See H.R. 1907, 106th Cong.,
1st Sess. §§ 201-03 (1999). In an attempt at political compromise to salvage any
kind of "patent reform" legislation, the bill now (as of late October 1999) has
been amended so that the PUR or "first inventor rights" provision applies only
to so-called "method-of-doing-business" software patents. Id.
Although prior user rights clearly have a number of both positive and
negative aspects, the concept does seem to fit more logically within the first-to-
file priority system employed by other nations than within the U.S. first-to-
invent priority system. See Kupferschmid, supra note 136, at 215, 235-36. As
previously noted, however, one should not make too much of the difference
between first-to-invent and first-to-file because the first one to file in the
United States usually wins any contest with another who filed second but
claims to have invented first. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
141 For the U.S. version of the enablement requirement, see 35 U.S.C.
112, 1 (1994).
142 Id.
[Vol. 20:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol20/iss4/1
EVOLUTION OF CHINESE A TTITUDES
bodiment"), that mode has to be revealed.143 Whenever a U.S.
patent's validity is challenged for failing to disclose the best mode,
the court must first make a subjective inquiry- did the applicant
actually contemplate a preferred embodiment?'" If so, the court
then must determine whether the best mode was described ade-
quately- that is, was the description of the best mode "ena-
bling"?
145
Chinese patent law itself does not include a best mode re-
quirement, but the implementing regulations do. One can see
clearly from the relative vagueness of the patent law, with a num-
ber of essential details omitted, and the far more complete nature
of the regulations, that the two are supposed to work in tandem
and that the latter is to be viewed as existing on the same legal
plane as the former. The patent law's implementation regulations
incorporate a best mode disclosure requirement identical to that
of the United States.
46
(10) In line with the general Chinese attitude toward dispute
resolution (keeping disputes out of court if at all possible and em-
phasizing mediation, administrative resolution, and other non-
litigation mechanisms), China's 1985 patent law created adminis-
trative authorities for patent affairs.14 This structure was not
changed by the 1993 amendments. Although patent disputes may
be taken to the People's Court,148 the large majority of them are
resolved through mediation conducted by the administrative
authorities.1 49 Dispute resolution by mediation has long been the
Oriental norm, Confucius himself having issued caveats about re-
143 See, e.g., Spectra-Physics v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1535 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
144 See Michael L. Leetzow et al., 1996 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1675, 1719-21 (1997).
145 See id.
146 See P.R.C. Patent Regulations, supra note 135, art. 18(8) (stating that a
patent application must "describe in detail the best mode contemplated by the
applicant for carrying out the invention or utility model, with explanation by
way of example in appropriate circumstances, and with references to the draw-
ings, if any").
147 See id. arts. 76-77.
141 See id. art. 77.
149 See David Hill & Judith Evans, Chinese Patent Law: Recent Changes
Align China More Closely With Modern International Practice, 27 GEo. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 359, 392 (1994).
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sort to legalistic resolution mechanisms."' Such an attitude has
much to commend it in many types of disputes, especially when
compared with some American adversarial excesses."51 Although
we should in no way discourage the Chinese from incorporating
traditional non-adversarial methods into their developing legal
system, which appropriately should be an East-West hybrid, ma-
jor work needs to be done to bring the rule of law applied by
well-trained judges and lawyers into that system.
6. RECENT EVIDENCE OF PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS
6.1. U.S. Efforts Immediately After the 1995 MO U
Despite the modernization of China's patent system, as late as
1995 some critics argued that the law's full implementation and its
intended salutary effects remained largely unrealized."5 China
had shown an inclination to keep much of its patent law separate
from the Chinese domestic economic structure. As a conse-
quence, the great majority of invention patent applications were
filed by foreign entities, whereas the great majority of applica-
tions filed by Chinese subjects were only for utility models.
Some have argued that a patent system is unlikely to be effective
without much more development of the nation's general legal sys-
tem, and others have contended that a workable patent system by
itself will not assist in developing a market economy, as long as
the Chinese have little political and personal freedom to pursue
the advantages created by it."'
Many problems with Chinese patent law undoubtedly re-
mained after 1995. Most of the news Americans hear on the sub-
ject of intellectual property in a country like China focuses on
150 See, e.g., THE WISDOM OF CONFUCIUS 198 (Lin Yutang ed. & trans.,
1938) ("Confficius said 'In presiding over lawsuits, I'm as good as any man.
The thing is to aim so that there should be no lawsuits.'").
151 See, e.g., John R. Allison, The Context Properties, and Constitutionality
ofNonconsensualArbitration: A Study of Four Systems, 1990 J. DISP. REMOL. 1, 1-
8.
152 See, e.g., Tiefenbrun, supra note 8; ALFORD, supra note 10 (concluding,
along with Tiefenbrun, that American policy in regard to intellectual property
law in China is misguided and has been ultimately unsuccessful despite numer-
ous bilateral agreements).
153 See ALFORD, supra note 10.
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music, movie, and software copyright piracy"5 4 because it is more
flagrant, visible, and of larger magnitude than patent infringe-
ment. Duplicating digital expressions is far easier and cheaper
than replicating technology of even slight sophistication. Despite
its lack of an American media blitz comparable to that provided
for copyright piracy, patent protection needs much more work.
Indeed, without even more aggressive Chinese patent enforce-
154 Although software piracy traditionally implicated only copyrights, in
the last several years patents have come to occupy a position in the protection
of software m ing them at least as important as copyrights, if not more so.
This development can be traced to two threads of U.S. federal court decisions.
The first has greatly expanded patent protection for software inventions. See,
e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (opening the door modestly to
software patents after a series of decisions finding algorithms not to be patent-
able subject matter by holding that an invention, patentable when viewed as a
whole, is not rendered unpatentable subject matter because software is an inte-
gral part of the invention); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172
F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that pure software, though c6nsisting of al-
gorithms, is patentable subject matter as long as it produces a useful result- it
does not have to accomplish a physical transformation); State St. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing
not only that the algorithms comprising software can be patentable as a step-
by-step process, but discarding the traditional view that the methods of doing
business were not patentable subject matter); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (marking the beginning point of modern sotware patent jurispru-
dence according to many, though still seemingly requiring very artful claim
drafting to make the steps in software read as though they accomplish a physi-
cal transformation in a machine).
The second thread of U.S. federal court decisions has greatly reduced the
scope of copyright protection for software. Copyright law now protects the
code and some non-iteral elements, but not the ideas incorporated in internal
interfaces and other architectural software elements, which are more appropri-
ate for patent protection. The first case manifesting this now almost universal
view of the scope of copyright protection for software is Computer Assoc. Int'l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), which disavowed the approach
taken by the Third Circuit six years earlier in Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1222 (distin-
guishing between unprotectable ideas and protected expressions, beginning the
analysis by setting the level of abstraction at far too high a level- the overall
purpose of the program- which led to a conclusion that almost everything else
was expression protected by copyright). The Computer Associates case began at
a much lower level of abstraction- the subroutines in the program, leading to
the result described above. Since 1992, every circuit court and district court to
face the issue has adopted the Computer Associates rationale. In addition to sev-
eral other recent decisions in the Second Circuit and numerous district court
decisions, other courts of appeals confronting the issue have followed Com-
puter Associates. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir.
1996 ; Engineering Dynamics v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir.
1994); Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993);
Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., 994 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1993).
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ment efforts, as the Chinese increase their technological capabili-
ties and thus their ability to replicate foreign technology, we can
expect that patent infringement will receive similar American
business and media attention.
Still unhappy with the P.R.C.'s progress in protecting intellec-
tual property rights, in 1995 the U.S. Trade Representative once
again threatened to impose huge U.S. import tariffs (100%) on
$1.8 billion worth of Chinese goods unless China rapidly made
more progress in enforcing its laws and agreements.' A Sino-
American trade war was narrowly averted again by the successful
negotiation of another MOU in 1995. Instead of focusing on sub-
stantive patent and other intellectual property law, the 1995
MOU correctly focused on improvements to China's judicial and
administrative institutions, China's efforts to educate the public
about intellectual property protection, and a cooperative P.R.C.-
United States program of continual communication and consulta-
tion regarding Chinese implementation of its commitments."5 6
The 1995 MOU also focused on P.R.C. efforts to actively dimin-
ish the deleterious effects of "localism"- the disobedience by
some city and provincial leaders of the P.R.C. central govern-
ment's antipiracy dictates.'
Rather unrealistically, Americans wanted improvement in
China's patent, copyright, and trademark systems to occur with
great rapidity. Thus, in May 1996, when the 1995 MOU was
barely one year-old, the U.S. Trade Representative once again
threatened China with trade sanctions. This dispute was resolved
by yet another agreement in June 1996.5 This latest agreement
' See Angela Mia Beam, Piracy ofAmerican Intellectual Property in China,
4 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 335, 352-53 (1995); Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual
Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to Protection and the Needfor the Rule
ofLaw, 15 UCLA PAC. BAsIN L.J. 1, 7 (1996).
156 See Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995,
P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 881.
157 See id.; see also Berkman, supra note 155, at 16-20 (emphasizing the prob-
lem of localism as one of the key impediments to actual achievement of the
P.R.C.'s patent, copyright, and trademark protection goals).
158 See, e.g., Seth Faison, U.S. and China Agree on Pact To Fight Piracy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 1996, at Al. With this agreement, the United States was con-
cerned primarily about perceived problems with access to certain important
Chinese markets and only secondarily with intellectual property. See Renewal
of MFN Status for China: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways & Means, 103d Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement
of Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative) in FED. NEWS SERV., June
17, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
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was reached so quickly because of a U.S. conviction, after investi-
gation, that China was engaged in very proactive efforts to satisfy
the concerns of the United States and other developed nations."5 9
6.2. Overall Economic Conditions
Anyone questioning the P.R.C.'s commitment and sustained
effort to modernize its economy through the use of market prin-
ciples will find it hard to argue with the fact that the Chinese
economy grew at an annual rate of about seven percent from the
early 1980s to the mid-1990s160 and at almost ten percent in 1996,
just before East Asia as a whole fell into a regional depression.161
While the regional recession is largely attributable to serious eco-
nomic problems in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines, it has negatively affected China because of China's
still-disproportionate dependence on neighboring countries.
1 62
These countries are very important to China because of their
heavy investment in China and their demand for Chinese ex-
ports.1 63 During the past two years, for example, foreign invest-
The United States is able to use threatened unilateral trade sanctions as a
sword of Damocles over China, even after the Uruguay Round of GATT cre-
ated the WTO, because China has not yet become a member of the WTO.
Once China becomes a member, claims by the United States or other WTO
members that China does not adequately protect intellectual property will
constitute unfair international trade practice complaints, which must be sub-
mitted to the WTO for formal dispute resolution.
159 See Faison, supra note 158; Hearing, supra note 158.
6 See Mark C. Lewis, Note, Contract Law in the People's Republic of
China- Rule or Tool: Can the PRC's Foreign Economic Contract Law be Admin-
istered According to the Rule of Law?, 30 VAND. J. TSANSNAT'L L. 495, 496
(1997) (discussing the international business community's recognition of China
as a market power); Development: Third World Growth Slow Over Last Decade,
INTER PRESS SERv., Dec. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws
File.
161 See The Science Coalition, Trends in R&D- People's Republic of China
(visited June 15, 1999) <http://www.sciencecoalition.org/trends china.
htm> [hereinafter Trends in R&D- People's Republic of China]; Chinese-Statis-
tics Bureau Releases 1996 Figures, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
Dec. 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
162 See Brian Bremner, Asia- How Real is the Recovery, Bus. WK., May 3,
1999, at 56.
163 See China and India Compared, Bus. LINE, Aug. 19, 1999, available in
LEXIS, Country Reports, China Country Files. The other Asian nations have
experienced recession largely because of antiquated banking systems and the
failure to shut inefficientplants. See Bremner, supra note 162, at 57-58 (detail-
ing ongoing efforts to reform plant inefficiencies in Korea and rescue Indone-
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ment in the P.R.C. has dropped substantially, arguably for rea-
sons having little or nothing to do with events within China."6'
Although substantial economic problems remain in these coun-
tries, the Asian recession seems to have bottomed out, and a re-
covery appears to have begun.16 Moreover, by mid-1999, foreign
investment in the P.R.C. was again on the upswing, particularly
in its various cities, the 32 special economic zones, 166 and the
autonomous regions where much of China's technological, manu-
facturing, and other forms of economic growth had been centered
for several years." The recovery of foreign investment in par-
sia's banking system). While China's banking system still needs further re-
forming, the P.R.C. has been very active in closing plants that engage in piracy.
See Hearing, supra note 158, at 3. Moreover, there is mounting evidence that
China is attacking its banking problems more aggressively than other East
Asian countries. See Profile- China Banking Industry- May 1999, AsIA PULSE,
May 20, 1999, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
Although we speak of the recession as not being primarily a Chinese reces-
sion, some economists do argue that China might be close to its own recession
if not for large spending on public works projects. A few of these experts view
many of the P.R.C.'s public works projects as "dubious," but we do not know
the criteria used to form this opinion, how many of the economists studying
China hold it, or the strength with which it is held. See, e.g., Bremner, supra
note 162, at 58. Moreover, short-term government capital spending is recog-
nized as one of several tools to replace declining private investment and assuage
the effects of recession. See, e.g., BELTON M. FLEISHER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
ECON. 564-67 (1987).
164 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 158; Foreign Investment in China Drops 12.6
Percent in January-April, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 19, 1999, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
165 See, e.g., Owen Ullmann, et al., Speed Up that Line!, Bus. WK., May 17,
1999, at 40 (emphasizing rapid recovery of manufacturing sector in Asia, as
well as other signs of regional economic recovery). In the past few months,
there has appeared strong evidence that China's economy is regaining strength
from internal growth more rapidly than other Asian nations. See Dexter Rob-
erts et al., China's New Revolution, Bus. WK., Sept. 27, 1999, at 72 (providing
evidence that the private sector, driven by an entrepreneurial spirit, is quietly,
but rapidly replacing crumbling state businesses). Indeed, the authors note that
when one looks at China's economic future, its reported economic growth
rates may actually be understated because of the drag created by disappearing
state-owned enterprises. See id.
116 China created a small number of these SEZs only in coastal areas during
the 1980s, but they have now expanded inland. See China- Zones Vow to At-
tract More Funds, CHINA DAILY, May 25, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Allwld File.
167 See, e.g., China- More Foreign Funds in Guangzhou, AsiAiNFo DAiLY
CINA NEWS, May 26, 1999, at 4, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld
File; Xinjiang Considered Popular Spot/or Foreig Investment, CHNA BuSINESS
INFORMATIN NETWORK, May 26, 1999, avible in LEXIS, World Library,
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ticular parts of China, despite declines in China as a whole, may
simply indicate that foreign investors have become more selec-
tive. 6 With improvement in the regional Asian economy and
Chinese economic modernization that has continued apace, Chi-
nese economic growth may not only resume its large annual
gains, but actually surpass them."" Although China has not re-
gained its ten percent annual economic growth rate of 1996-97, by
mid-1999 some reports indicated that it had recovered to eight
percent17 and seemed poised to attain its goal of annual economic
growth of eight to nine percent through 2010.171
The annual political ritual in Washington concerning renewal
of China's most-favored-nation trading status with the United
States, which is essential to maintaining relatively open trade
lanes between the two countries, occurred yet again in May of
1999, when President Clinton proposed continuation of that
status. 72 With recent allegations of Chinese espionage in U.S. de-
fense laboratories, as well as the approaching congressional and
presidential elections, many members of Congress have played to
what they apparently perceive as nationalistic, and perhaps even
xenophobic, feelings among their constituents and have opposed
Allwld File; see also China Approves 4,925 More Foreign-Funded Businesses, ASIA
PULSE, May 27, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (indicat-
ing strong foreign investment in China).
168 See China- Zones Vow to Attract More Funds, supra note 166 (detailing
investor interest in China's development zones even during the Asian financial
turmoil); see also China- More Foreign Funds in Guangzhou, supra note 167;
Xinjiang Considered Popular Spot for Foreign Investment, supra note 167; China
Approves 4,925 More Foreign-Funded Businesses, supra note 167.
169 We admit that this is a rather speculative prediction, but it is quite plau-
sible based on evidence from sources such as China- WB Chief Economist
Praises China's Macroeconomic Policies, CHINA BUsINESS INFORMATION
NETWORK, July 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, Country Reports, China Coun-
try Files; China- Bright Signs in Economy Show Up, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 16,
1999, available in LEXIS, Country Reports, China Country Files; and China-
Export Decline Shows Signs of Slowdown, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 12, 1999, avail-
able in LEXIS, Country Reports, China Country Files.
17o See China- Investment From Asia Commences Recovery, CHINA DAILY,
May 23, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; China Says In-
vestment from East Asia Increasing, AAP NEWSFEED, May 24, 1999, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
171 See Trends in R&D- People's Republic of China, supra note 161.
172 See, e.g., Dunne, supra note 12, at 7 (noting that Clinton, with strong
backing from the business lobby, proposed renewal of China's MFN status
shortly after the Cox Report alleging Chinese espionage).
1999]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j Int'l Econ. L.
renewal of China's MEN status."13 Senator Richard Gephardt (D-
Mo.) comes close to being a poster boy for the protectionist ele-
ment in Congress, but for the fact that he voted affirmatively on
legislation to implement the Uruguay Round of GATT permit-
ting the United States' entry into the WTO, after having op-
posed it during the presidential primaries of 1992."7 He has,
however, long opposed placing China on par with other U.S.
trading partners, using whatever rationale happened to be useful
at the time- frequently the human rights issue- and is once
again on the anti-China bandwagon.176  We mention Senator
Gephardt because far more of the anti-China sentiment in Con-
173 See, e.g., Stan Crock et al., The New China Syndrome- The Cox Report
Casts a Pall Over the Political and Business Climate, Bus. WK., June 7, 1999, at
30 [hereinafter The Cox Report Casts a Pall] (reporting on the increased ammu-
nition provided to the anti-China element in Congress by the espionage alleged
in the Cox Report).
174 See generally Michael Kranish, White House, Dole Wrangle Over GA 77,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 22, 1994, at National/Foreign 1 (indicating that
Gephardt supported GATT).
175 See Nancy Dunne, US Anti-GAT Lobby Steps Up Campaign, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at 6 (explaining that Gephardt supported a resolution
warning the President against GATT legislation).
176 See generally David M. Lampton, China- Think Again, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Spring 1998, at 13, 24 (debunking common negative assumptions about
China, but agreeing with the negative perception of China's environmental
pollution, and juaposing aMay 1997 alarmist, xenophobic Gephardt speech
against Lampton's own research-based realistic view of China). Actually,
China has not been alone on Gephardt's list of whipping boy countries for in
the 1988 presidential primaries, he lent voice to the bright idea of imposing an
import duty that would quadruple to $48,000 the price of the Korean Hyun-
dai, that dreaded competitor of the American automobile industry. See Smith
Hempstone, Gephardt's Moment of Truth, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 26,
1988, at B-11. In the 1992 presidential primaries, Gephardt decided to vent his
indignation against Japan. See generally Charles Krauthammer, Do We Really
Need a New Enemy?, TIME, Mar. 23, 1992, at 76. Gephardt received virtually
no votes in either primary outside his home state. He also was a fervent oppo-
nent of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), voting
against it in 1992 and opposing its extension in 1997. See Marc Hebert & Gene
Godley, Fast Track, Truly a Slow Process, Bus. MEX., June 1997, at Legal Briefs;
Christopher Matthews, Gephardt Shows He Again Has the Fire, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, June 1, 1997, at H3 (observing not only Gephardt's various protec-
tionist positions, but also his apparent desire to select the issues and their tim-
ing to maximize his chances of supplanting Vice President Al Gore as the
Democrat presidential nominee in 2000); see also Gephardt's New Protectionism,
DETROIT NEWS, May 28, 1997, at A10 ("And Mr. Gephardt's human rights ar-
guments bear the suspicion that they are a guise for less noble, protectionist
objectives.").
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gress is Republican than Democratic"' and because he provides
such an excellent example of the politician (of whom there are
many) who adopts xenophobic attitudes when it is politically ex-
pedient." 8
There can be no question that China's human rights record is
terribly flawed, " and that the nation is still primarily autocratic.
Several points are worth making in regard to both conditions.
First, the Clinton administration's policy of decoupling econom-
ics from human rights and its concomitant pursuit of economic
normalization with China has clearly helped the Chinese eco-
nomic rebuilding effort that began in the early 1980s to flourish
in the 1990s. Although one cannot say with any conviction that
China's human rights record has improved dramatically during
the '80s and '90s, it has not worsened as Sino-American economic
ties have become closer, and we do not think there is a plausible
reason to believe that it would have improved had the United
States coupled economic ties with human rights improvements.
Instead, we think the likely outcome would have been a trade
war, less Chinese economic development, and still no improve-
ment in human rights. If there was any evidence that condition-
ing economic relations on human rights improvements would ac-
tually have improved the lot of Chinese political dissidents, a
strong moral argument could be made for coupling. The evidence
is not there, however.
" See Tyler Marshall, Partisanship Doesn't Stop at the Water's Edge, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1998, at A5.
178 Speaking of which, after learning of the Cox Report's contents, Repub-
lican presidential front-runner George W. Bush stated: "China is not America's
strategic partner. China is a competitor." See The Cox Report Casts a Pall, supra
note 173, at 31. Although Bush presumably was speaking of China as nowbe-
ing a military competitor, this kind of rhetoric, whether acted on or not, can
easily cause serious damage to economic relationships as well. Moreover,
China is not likely to be a belligerent military competitor. The country can-
not afford an arms race, and hegemony simply does not seem to be on its
agenda. See Lampton, supra note 176 (debunking the myth of Chinese hegem-
ony). Moreover, it is common knowledge that when technology is the subject,
friends do sometimes steal from friends, and the authors continue trying to
figure out which of our allies is not also an economic competitor. Suffice it to
say, we believe the seizure-like responses to the Cox Report by some members
of Congress are more about American politics than true military or economic
concerns.
179 See, e.g., Michael Elliott, Beyond History's Shadow, NEWSWEEK, June 29,
1998, at 20, 25 (observing that, in 1998, more than 200,000 people remained in
prison without being charged or tried for a crime).
1999]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
Second, as we noted earlier, many celebrated economic think-
ers such as Friedman, Dicey, Hayek, Mises, and Simons have
maintained that political freedom, and the human rights that go
with it, cannot exist without economic freedom; moreover, eco-
nomic freedom over a lengthy period of time tends to produce
political freedom and human rights."'0 The West, therefore, is un-
likely to achieve full human rights for the Chinese, either as a
stand-alone issue or coupled with economic pressure. Over time,
however, increasing economic freedom brought about by market
economics will encourage increased political freedom and, corre-
spondingly, greater respect for human rights.1
Third, it is true that the P.R.C. remains officially an authori-
tarian state. However, both economic and political influences
have flowed rapidly from Beijing to the large number of cities,
special economic zones, and autonomous regions, where both
economic and political freedom tend to be greater than permitted
by official P.R.C. policy."' This result of the P.R.C.'s conscious
determination in the early 1980s to decentralize much decision
making is salutary in many ways, but has produced the byproduct
of localism- a loss of control by Beijing over local officials and
businesses- that can have various effects on the central govern-
ment's ability to achieve its objectives. As we discuss shortly, lo-
calism's negative effects manifest themselves when a locality is
able to ignore the P.R.C.'s laudable goals, such as enforcing its
patent laws. Localism's positive effects obviously occur when a
locality grants more freedom than the central government has in
mind. China is a country that does not lend itself readily to one
simple label.
As noted earlier, despite China-bashing on the MFN issue that
bears the earmarks of pre-election presidential and congressional
politics, it was inevitable that China's MFN status would be re-
newed,"83 because (1) revocation of China's MFN status requires a
two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress and there were far
more than enough members of both parties in both houses who
saw the folly of crippling U.S. trade with China,184 and (2) exten-
180 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 12.
181 See id. at 8.
112 For a more thorough discussion of localism, see infra Section 6.4.
.83 See supra note 12.
184 See Dunne, supra note 12.
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sion of China's MFN status had strong backing from American
business."' Finally, the P.R.C. and its people have made it clear
that, despite their justifiable and lingering anger at NATO's
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which they have
aimed primarily at the United States, they have no intention of
letting the event hinder further development of economic rela-
tions with the United States and other Western nations.186
6.3. China's Commitment ofResources to Domestic Research
and Development
China has followed the typical pattern of a developing nation
by depending heavily on foreign investment and imported tech-
nology before being able to generate substantial internal growth
and technological advancement on its own."' An economy must
reach a certain stage of overall development before it can commit
large resources to R&D. It cannot reach a much higher develop-
mental level, however, without increasing domestic R&D in-
vestment. Attracting foreign investment and foreign technology
can take a country's economy only so far. Technological ad-
vancement driven by internal R&D is a prerequisite to further
economic development. Without it, even the most effective pat-
ent system cannot contribute much beyond giving greater assur-
185 See id.
186 See generally China- Schneider Stands By Strategy, CHINA DAILY, May
23, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Library, Aliwld File (reporting that many
foreign investors are following the lead of France's Schneider Electric and
maintaining their investments in the Chinese market); Seth Faison, Business in
China: Longer-Term Worries, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1999, at CIO (indicating
Chinese separation of political and economic ramifications of the bombing);
NA TO Bombing to Have No Impact on WTO Hopes: China, ASIA PULSE, May
24, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Library, Alwld File (affirming China's
commitment to opening up to the outside world and consequently joining the
WTO); John Pomfret, Politics Fail to Stir Busy Air of Chinese City, WASH.
POST, May 27, 1999, at A31 (describing local pragmatic economic views in
Southern China).
187 See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT: "THE WORLD BANK GUIDELiNEs" 1-8, 11,12 (1993). China has
attracted a huge amount of foreign investment since it began its program of
economic modernization. For the past five years, it has been the second-largest
recipient of foreign investment in the world, behind only the United States.
See Chinese Official: China to Further Expand Opening-Up Drive, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, May 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld
File.
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ance to foreigners that their technology will be given reasonable
protection.
It is difficult to evaluate data pertaining to China's internal,
nonmilitary R&D resource commitment because it was virtually
zero until less than twenty years ago."'8 Chinese investment in
R&D as a percentage of its GNP averaged only 0.6% between
1981 and 1995.89 Again, however, this very unimpressive figure
is not especially meaningful because the time period over which
the average was calculated began just as China was beginning an
effort to work toward market economic principles, and there was
no R&D to speak of during the initial several years of that pe-
riod.1 90 By 1997, the figure was 0.64%, with a P.R.C. commit-
ment to increase it to 1.5% by the turn of the century.191 We do
not know whether the Asian recession will prevent China from
reaching that goal, but the Chinese leadership appears to be stead-
fast in its commitment to continued growth in R&D spending. 92
Moreover, data about R&D in China as a whole is very difficult
to assess because of the relative economic autonomy of many cit-
ies, special economic zones, and autonomous regions having had
their genesis in the original post-Mao decision to decentralize
economic decision making. Each such area engages not only in its
own efforts to attract foreign investment and foreign business
ventures, but also has meaningful discretion in directing its own
R&D investment program.93 Although the P.R.C. sets policies
188 See THE WORLD BANK, 1998 WORLD DEv. INDICATORS, § 5.12, at 298.
189 See id. This percentage put the P.R.C. slightly ahead of Greece and
slightly below Chile. In 1996, however, China's high-technology exports to-
taled almost $27 billion, or 21% of total exports, see id., but most of this vol-
ume resulted from imported technology. See Norman Wingrove, China Sees
Tripling of R&D Spending as Key to 21st Century Economic Power, RES. &
TECH. MGMT., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 2, 3.
190 See id.
191 See Basic Statistics on National Scientific and Technological Activities,
1998 CHINA STAT. Y.B. (State Stat. Bureau) No. 17, at § 20-38; Wingrove, supra
note 189, at 2.
192 See Wingrove, supra note 189, at 2.
193 See, e.g., China's Southwestern City Opens Investment Service Center,
XiNHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 28, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File; China- Xinjiang Considered Popular Spot for Foreign Investment,
CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, May 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Allwld File; China Hopes to Boost Foreign Investment in SEZs, ASIA
PULSE, May 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File;
China- More Foreign Funds in Guangzhou, ASIAINFO DAILY CHINA NEWS,
May 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; Foreign Invest-
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and overall goals and provides funding for many research efforts,
most of the actual internal R&D is no longer managed in a top-
down manner."
China's current R&D outlays are woefully inadequate to sup-
port internal development of enough technology of sufficient so-
phistication to work hand-in-hand with the new patent system in
achieving the technological advancement necessary for sustained
economic growth. Several points must be kept in mind, however,
that provide ample reason for optimism.
(1) The P.R.C.'s commitment to an R&D effort is new by
any relative measure, and its actions have demonstrated that the
commitment is real. While China's R&D spending is currently
far below that of developed nations as a percentage of GDP, it is
at least increasing while that of Western nations is declining. In
1994, U.S. R&D expenditures were 2.61% of GDP, Italy's were
1.21%, and Canada's were 1.47%, each having declined as a per-
centage of GDP every year since 1991.'9' Data on R&D expendi-
tures for several economic powers were available in our source
only through 1993; Japan's R&D expenditures in 1993 were
2.72% of GDP (the same as that of the United States that year),
Germany's were 2.48%, France's were 2.41%, and the United
Kingdom's were 2.19%.196 Since 1991, many other countries in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD")have experienced declines in research and development
expenditures measured as a percentage of GDP. 97
(2) Some observers see parallels between China's development
in the early 1980s and that of Japan 30 years earlier 98 At the
ment Rebounds in Jiangsu, China, ASIA PULSE, May 24, 1999, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; Chinese City Touts Investment Potential,
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, May 19, 1999; China- Chengdu- Speed Up Techni-
cal Transformation with Foreign Investment, ASIAINFO DAILY CHINA NEWS,
May 17, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (al sources
demonstrating that much of the authority, incentive, and responsibility for at-
tracting and maintaining foreign investment lies with the provinces, cities, and
special economic zones).
194 See id.
195 See R&D Spending Down Across OECD Nations, RES. & TECH. MGMT.,
Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 3, 3-4.
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 See, e.g., Joseph A. Martellaro & Jing-Yau Chen, Some Aspects of Growth
and Technical Progress in the People's Republic of China, 40 ECONOMIA
INTERNAZIONALE 301, 310 (1987).
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start of its modernization program China probably was at about
the same point technologically as Japan was in the 1950s.' 99 China
needs substantial time to reach a relatively advanced technological
level, and there is no way to confidently predict whether the time
needed for China to reach that level will be similar to that of Ja-
pan. China has vastly greater expanses of usable land and natural
resources, and its people have a recorded history of greater crea-
tivity than the Japanese."' The Japanese, on the other hand, while
not known for creativity, have proved to be superb at managing,
organizing, and commercializing technology developed in the
United States and elsewhere."1
Another parallel with Japan may assist in forecasting China's
future. China was already polluted before the beginning of its
economic push, but exceptionally rapid economic growth has
rendered its environment an utter mess. 2 Although the Chinese
are already starting to show concern about their environment,
one visiting Western diplomat commented that, if cleanup efforts
do not take a more serious turn, "it will make Eastern Europe
look like a nature park."2 3 The relation to our topic is that,
191 ASIAN & PACIFIC CENTRE FOR TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY,
TECHNOLOGY POLICIES AND PLANNING: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 7-8
(1986) (noting that, late in the 1970s and early in the 1980's, about 80% of
China's technology was at approximately the same level of developed nations
such as Japan in the 1950s and 1960s).
200 See Toshiko Takenaka, Does a Cultural Barrier to the Intellectual Prop-
erty Trade Exist? The Japanese Example, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 153, 154-
55 (explaining that during periods when the Chinese and Koreans were produc-
ing their own technological advancements, the Japanese were focused not on
creating but on acquiring technology from their two more creative neighbors).
Moreover, historical records of the-kind showing centuries of Chinese creative
genius simply do not exist for the Japanese. For some examples of Chinese in-
ventions, see supra note 16.
201 See id. at 154.
202 See Ben Boer, The Rise of Environmental Law in the Asian Region, 32 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1503, 1504-05 (1999) (highlighting China's economic crisis);
David Lague, China May Be the World's Fastest Growing Economy, But Scientists
and Governor Chris Patten Last Week Drew Attention to the Environmental Cri-
sis That Has Come with the Industrial Boom, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
21, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (discussing
China's extensive pollution problems); see also Geoffrey Murray, China Envi-
ronmental Concerns Boon to Japanese Investment, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
May 17, 1999, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (discussing that
helping to clean up China's environment is likely to create meaningful invest-
ment opportunities for Japanese entities).
203 Lague, supra note 202, at 1.
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technological advancement or not, effective patent system or not,
a nation's economy and its people cannot prosper long without
drinkable water or breathable air. Dr. Peter Hills, director of the
Centre of Urban Planning and Environmental Management at
Hong Kong University, said:
Some people believe China will follow the Japanese model
and that is you get dirty, you get rich and then you clean
it up. Japan got dirty and rich between 1950 and 1970 and
cleaned up between 1970 and 1980. If you accept the
Japanese model and that kind of reasoning, it becomes a
race against time. The question is can China really get
rich enough quickly enough before the costs of cleaning
up become so horrendous that it is impractical.2 4
(3) The P.R.C. recently has been putting much of its national
R&D funding into the nation's universities, which have been
growing in number and quality."5 Before, most R&D funding
went to state-run institutes or government-run academies, particu-
larly the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which was a top-down
Soviet-style research entity."6 This change, in turn, has created a
healthy competition among China's universities both for funding
and for research accomplishment."7 Another positive outgrowth
of this R&D policy change is that universities, newly invigorated
in scientific and engineering research, have begun to form high-
tech business ventures that are at first affiliated with the schools
and then later spun-off, but still retain ties with their originating
universities."08 Although this pattern is now almost universal
throughout China, Fudan University in Shanghai is recognized as
the first to conceive of the idea and bring it to fruition.2 9
204 Id.
205 See David Swinbanks, Competition Entering Chinese Research, RES. &
TECH. MGMT., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 5, 5-6.
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 See id.
209 See id. The Chinese government claims to have done similar things,
namely, creating and spinning off 400 businesses from the Chinese Academy of
Sciences and two universities in the city, but academy officials privately admit
that less than 10% of these businesses have any substance or a secure future.
See id. at 6.
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(4) The new environment for scientific inquiry has enabled
the government and many universities to persuade bright young
scientists to return to China from the United States and
Europe.21 Most of these scientists are under age forty; they are
attracted not only by the remarkably different scientific envi-
ronment than that which existed when they left, but also by of-
fers of senior posts and research grants.2 ' Such a phenomenon is
especially striking given the traditional practice of awarding sen-
ior scientific positions and other prestigious positions only to
those advanced in years.212
China's commitment to the increased R&D investment neces-
sary for its new patent system to play a meaningful role in
China's economic future, and the results thus far produced by
that commitment, are probably best summarized as adolescent,
growing, and holding much promise, but still somewhat distant
from full maturity.
6.4. Localism- The Unplanned Progeny of Decentralization
As noted earlier, one of the cornerstones of the P.R.C.'s post-
Mao efforts to modernize its economy along market-based lines
was the decentralization of economic decision-making.213 As long
as Beijing's broad policies were followed, actual decisions about
economic planning, investing, allocating productive resources,
and achieving productivity and profit goals were relocated to the
enterprise level.2"4 In contrast with the former style of centralized
planning and control of all economic decisions- economic micro-
management from Beijing, if you will- decentralization seemed
to be an eminently sensible idea. Indeed, it is not only sensible
but palpably superior in most cases. As it has turned out, how-
ever, decentralization has produced negative repercussions for the
enforcement of patent laws and other intellectual property pro-
tections. Local authorities usually carry out Beijing's directives
without question, but the central government's intellectual prop-
erty policies seem to be the exception for some reason, most
210 See id.
211 See id.
212 See id.
213 See supra note 80.
214 See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 80, at 285-86.
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likely because of the unprecedented amounts of money to be
made by intellectual property rogues. 15
In its apparently sincere efforts to enforce its new patent law
and other intellectual property rules, P.R.C.'s central government
has discovered that it does not have the control it would like over
local government officials, who sometimes act in complicity with
powerful local business interests to whom they often are be-
holden for their positions.21' Occasionally, even a locally sta-
tioned military official is also in complicity, allowing illicit busi-
nesses to pirate intellectual property with virtual impunity."'
The P.R.C. has taken the problem of localism quite seriously by
making its eradication one of the cornerstones of the 1995
MOU.218 Many government raids on businesses profiting from
purloined foreign intellectual property have been widely publi-
cized in China's national and local press to signal Beijing's seri-
ousness.
2 19
Despite China's recent efforts to create a better educated,
trained, and presumably more independent cadre of judges, law-
yers, and administrative officials, not enough progress has been
made yet to combat localism. In perhaps the most important de-
velopment to date, the June 1996 agreement with the United
States, Beijing diminished its reliance on local authorities for en-
forcing its intellectual property laws against locally protected il-
licit businesses and pledged to turn over enforcement to the pow-
erful Ministry of Security, the P.R.C.'s national police force."0 If
such centralized enforcement efforts can succeed in eliminating
the deleterious effects of intellectual property localism without
interfering with the many positive attributes of economic decen-
tralization, the P.R.C. will have come a long way toward actualiz-
ing the role of patents, copyrights, and trademarks in economic
modernization. One way of achieving the best of decentraliza-
215 See Berkman, supra note 155, at 16.
216 See id. at 17.
217 See id. at 15-16.
218 See id. at 4, 9-10.
219 For reasons previously discussed in footnote 15, most publicity sur-
rounding wides read intellectual property piracy and Chinese enforcement ef-
forts against it has focused on infringement of copyrighted music, movies, and
software. Localism also permits factories producing patent-infringing products
to resist P.R.C. enforcement efforts.
220 See, e.g., Faison, supra note 158 (outlining the details of the U.S.-Chinese
agreement).
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tion and avoiding the worst of localization is to use not only the
iron fist of the Ministry of Security, but also to provide more
funding to local officials that could be used in assisting their en-
forcement efforts. Not all local officials have cozy relationships
with intellectual property pirates; both those who do and those
who do not would be armed with greater independence to follow
the P.R.C.'s intellectual property policies if given more funding
assistance to go along with the enforcement assistance of the Min-
istry of Security.
Localism also has exacerbated the difficulties of enforcement
coordination among the P.R.C. and its thirty provinces, autono-
mous regions, and municipalities. 1  Although these problems
remain, meaningful progress apparently is being made. In July
1994, the P.R.C. established the Intellectual Property Executive
Conference (IPEC) as a unit of the State Council.' IPEC first
focused on the details of establishing coordinating administrative
offices in the various regions and making public the points of
contact for reporting infringement.' IPEC then concentrated on
enforcement activities, achieving substantial if not total coopera-
tion from local officials; coordinated enforcement efforts will
continue and increase.224 The agency also has initiated an exten-
sive education and public awareness program." These efforts are
further demonstrated by the provision of intellectual property
education to approximately fifty percent of Chinese civil servants
and eighty percent of the management staff at research institutes
and industries. 6
6.5. Developing a Legal System and Intellectual Property
Regime Governed by the Rule of Law
Yet to be completed is the further strengthening of China's
judicial and administrative structures to deal with the intricacies
of not only a modern patent system, but also the panoply of
other laws necessary to support a market economy. Like that of
221 See Berkman, supra note 155, at 20-21.
2 See Duan Ruichun, China's Intellectual Property Rights Protection To-
wards the 21st Century, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 215, 217-18 (1998).
223 See id.
224 See id.
2 See id.
226 See id.
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the former Soviet Union, China's legal system under Communist
rule has been, until recently, purely instrumentalist, serving
merely as a means to achieve state control. " 7 Government by the
rule of law serves as a means to provide the public with proce-
durally systematic and substantively fair protection for private
property and personal rights, to assist people and companies in
realizing their reasonable commercial expectations, and to main-
tain order without infringing on fundamental rights of expres-
sion, freedom, or privacy. No system approaches perfection in
achieving these worthy objectives.
Governance by the rule of law also is essential to an effective
system for protecting patented inventions and other intellectual
property. That part of the legal and administrative system de-
voted to granting and enforcing patents cannot operate in a vac-
uum; it must be part of an effective whole. To say the least, it is
difficult to develop a workable legal system anywhere in which
there is no tradition of governance by law. It is harder still in the
largest nation on earth, with a history of Byzantine governmental
structures, from the Zhou dynasty in 221 B.C. through modern
Communist rule, that have existed primarily to serve the state's
interests.
The task becomes more daunting still in a nation with both
ancient Confucian cultural traditions and more recent socialist
ones antithetical to the rule of law. Not only are the leaders un-
accustomed to the law, but also the population is unknowledge-
able about law and the role it is supposed to play in governing a
society. In such a nation, judges are too few and ill-trained, lead-
ing not only to erroneous decisions but also to decisions lacking
impartiality. The same is true of decisions made by poorly
trained administrative officials. Lawyers are few and poorly
trained because they, and the law schools that educate them, have
been inadequate since even before Chairman Mao and his opera-
tives destroyed them in the Cultural Revolution. 8 Rectifying
these problems represents perhaps the most difficult task of all
faced by post-Mao reformers.
Chinese economic reformers of the 1980s did not immediately
attack all of the problems caused by the practically non-existent
legal system, because they lacked understanding of law and its
_ See Lewis, supra note 160, at 500-01.
228 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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processes and because the problem was simply too large and com-
plex to tackle all at once. They saw the need for laws to serve as a
foundation for economic modernization, and thus adopted a great
deal of economic legislation. 9 They too often seemed to equate
enactment with implementation, however, and it was not until
later that they saw (or were forced by the West to see) that laws
mean nothing without an adequate number of courts staffed by
competent judges knowledgeable in and committed to the rule of
law, trained support personnel, similarly skilled administrative
agency personnel, and well-educated lawyers to make both courts
and administrative agencies accessible.
To their credit, once the Chinese leaders saw what was
needed, they set about to learn and make improvements, to the
extent permitted by the resources at hand. Even when their ac-
tions create cognitive dissonance because of their life-long immer-
sion in Communist ideology, in recent years they usually have
given in to pragmatism. More law schools are being created,"0
and they are paying more attention to the analytical education of
their students." The number of lawyers increased from 3,000 in
1980 to over 90,000 in early 1995, with an apparently attainable
goal of 150,000 lawyers and 450,000 other trained legal personnel
(presumably paralegals and law clerks) by this year. 2  Judges
without adequate legal training are being provided with it. 3 One
2 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
230 See, e.g., Prestigious Qinghua University Re-opens Law School After 47
Years, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 26, 1999, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File (reporting the reopening of a law school
in one of China's most prestigious universities).
231 See, e.g., Law Courses to Focus on Analysis, Reasoning, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, May 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File (not-
ing that the many new law schools are not only seeking to provide a broader
legal education rather than the traditional highly specialized courses of study,
but also are focusing much more on legal analysis and reasoning).
212 See Berkman, supra note 155, at 29; see also William P. Alford, Tasselled
Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and Tension in the World of Chinese
Legal Workers, 141 CHINA Q. 22, 22, 30 (1995) (discussing the rapid growth of
the legal profession in the P.R.C. since 1980). Given that Alford's data is over
five years old, and that China has been making a sustained, major effort to ex-
pand the number of law schools and law graduates, his number of law gradu-
ates clearly is far below today's.
233 See Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China's Civil Procedure: Judging the
Courts, 45 AM. J. CoMP. L. 793, 795-97 (1997) (discussing various educational
and training programs for Chinese judges); see also Guoqiang Lu, Advances in
the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in China, HARv. CHINA REV.,
Summer 1998 at 71, 72 (noting that over 3,000 judicial personnel have received
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of the most notable developments in seeking a judiciary driven by
the rule of law was the 1995 passage by the People's Congress of
the Law on Judges, which requires those entering the judiciary to
be formally educated, pass examinations, and continue training
after appointment." Yet another landmark legal event occurred
in 1995, when the People's Congress gave much greater authority
to Chinese customs officials to stop the importation of products
that infringe on the rights of foreign owners of patents, copy-
rights, and trademarks. This effort appears to be working rea-
sonably well according to recent reports.235
Yet another crucial element in developing a tradition of gov-
ernance by the rule of law in general, and a receptive attitude to-
ward treating some intellectual products as protectable property
rights in particular, is greater public knowledge and acceptance of
these concepts. The Chinese populace possessed little cognizance
of the rule of law since most of their cultural norms and values
were shaped first by Confucianism, then by the practice of either
not codifying laws or making the codified laws available only to
political leaders and magistrates, and finally by Communism."
The P.R.C.'s leadership has recognized that there can be no un-
derstanding or acceptance of the law's role in fairly and predicta-
bly defining rights and obligations in society unless a substantial
percentage of that society's members are adequately informed.
Thus, the government and the news media"37 have placed great
emphasis on imparting such knowledge to the Chinese people.
Hardly a day passes without multiple media outlets carrying vari-
ous stories about the law, its role in society, its benefits, and cau-
substantial new education and training, leading many observers to note the
great improvement in Chinese trials, even those involving technical or other-
wise complex issues).
" See NPC Committee Adopts Law on Judges, F.B.I.S. DAILY REP.-
CHINA, F.B.I.S. No. CHI-95-054, Mar. 21, 1995, at 32; see also Berkman, supra
note 155, at 27.
235 See David Weild Ill & Hailing Zhang, Chinese Enforcement Efforts May
Protect JP, NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1998, at Cl1.
236 See Berkman, supra note 155, at 31-34. See generally Walter Gellhorn,
China's Quest for Legal Modernity, 1 J. CHINESE L. 1 (1987) (discussing the his-
torical development of Chinese efforts to modernize its legal system); Hugh T.
Scogin, Jr., Between Heaven and Man: Contract and the State in Han Dynasty
China, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1325 (1990) (discussing the emergence of modern
Chinese views toward contract law).
17 The two are no longer precisely co-terminous.
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tionary reports about the consequences for lawbreakers." One
illuminating anecdote that was reported first by the Associated
Press, 2 39 and then widely publicized throughout the nation by the
Chinese state press,240 concerned the struggles of a local merchant
against counterfeiters of the trademarked condoms and sex toys
he sold. He was ultimately bankrupted because of the free ride
taken by counterfeiters on his trademarked goods.24 Although
involving flagrant trademark infringement rather than patent in-
fringement, the widespread coverage of the event and the public's
negative reaction to the counterfeiting illustrate several important
phenomena. First, the extent of the event's coverage provides a
concrete demonstration of the government's and the media's ef-
forts to educate the public about law and intellectual property.
Second, the P.R.C. correctly perceived this as an illustration to
which the Chinese people could easily relate, involving a small,
local business destroyed by a violation of intellectual property
rights. Third, the negative public reaction to the event revealed a
perception that intellectual property rights are important, that
their violation can cause real harm to the Chinese themselves, not
just to foreign businesses, and that the law has a legitimate role in
protecting intellectual property.
7. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The Chinese, with the oldest continuing civilization in the
world and a tradition of inventive and creative genius, have an-
cient cultural and legal traditions completely polar to the protec-
tion of intellectual products. Failure to understand Chinese cul-
ture led to the failure of foreign government attempts to force
patent and other intellectual property laws on China. Confucian-
ism, and then Communism, simply did not countenance the idea
23 See Berkman, supra note 155, at 15 n.64, 33. Most of the publicity
about enforcement efforts centers on copyright and trademark infringement
because piracy has become rampant. This is so because piracy of copyrights
and software is easier and it is far easier for the press to report, and for the pub-
lic to understand, stories about closing down huge factories producing pirated
CDs and videos than particular instances of patent infringement.
239 Elaine Kurtenbach, Condoms Among Latest Targets of Chinese Crack-
down on Counterfeits, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL
4409759.
240 See Berkman, supra note 155, at 33.
241 See id.
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of providing property-like protection to products of the individ-
ual intellect.
The P.R.C.'s post-Mao leaders, however, realized that their
economy must modernize by adopting fundamental market-based
precepts or else face ultimate economic dysfunction of cata-
strophic proportions. They recognized that a body of law had to
be created to serve as a foundation for creating a market economy
both as an end itself and as an attraction for more foreign invest-
ment. Without any tradition of governance by the rule of law,
however, they at first equated enactment with implementation.
Partly because of foreign pressure, especially from the United
States, and partly because the P.R.C.'s leadership came quickly to
recognize reality, China began major initiatives to improve their
overall system of higher education along with much greater em-
phasis on education in science, technology, and law. The Chinese
have encountered many problems en route, but much recent evi-
dence suggests that they are making quite meaningful progress.
Serious efforts on the part of the Chinese government have
made the new patent system more accessible.242 The emphasis on
training more scientists and engineers continues, as does the crea-
tion of more law schools, the training of more lawyers, and the
training of more patent specialists. By sending increasing num-
bers of students abroad for technical education, legal training, and
specialized training in patent law and practice, China has shown a
commitment to create a patent system that is more than just a su-
perficial concession to international pressure.243
242 See Jian, supra note 99, at 8-9.
243 There remains a significant problem for the Chinese, however, when
they send students to the United States for education in science and technol-
ogy, namely, persuading them to come back home. They are in demand in the
United States after graduation because of our own shortages of such technically
trained individuals, and only about 10% of them have been returning to China.
Indeed, many of the 13,000 Chinese students annually who study in the United
States manage to parlay a student visa into a passport. See, e.g., Maggie Farley,
Shanghai Youths Test Welcome Mat in U.S., L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1999, at Al.
Farley reported on a group of 32 Chinese high-school students in the United
States who failed to return to China as scheduled and were found by the U.S.
State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to
have been enrolled in classes elsewhere in the United States. While noting that
approximately 90% of Chinese students at various levels have not been return-
ing to China, the article observed that P.R.C. officials, U.S. diplomats in
China, and the INS now have a much greater awareness of the problem and a
greater commitment to cooperate in rectifying the situation. China will
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In addition, specialized intellectual property courts staffed
with judges having both technical and legal training have been es-
tablished in the major cities and special economic zones.2 For-
eign entities seeking to obtain or enforce patents in China must
use the patent agents and attorneys at one of five government-
approved patent agencies.24 The assistance of local counsel is al-
most always needed when legal matters must be dealt with in an-
other country, so in that respect the Chinese procedures for filing
by foreign applicants are not unique. The difference, of course, is
that there is a choice of only five representation entities to choose
from in China. However, requiring foreigners to use one of the
designated agencies probably is a wise policy decision for the time
being, because there still are not nearly enough well-trained pat-
ent agents and attorneys in China, and close government over-
sight of those handling the patent affairs of foreign clients is likely
to be necessary for some time to come. In the decades ahead, as
more trained patent specialists become available, the current re-
striction to a very small number of patent agencies will have to be
changed.
China has attempted to make its patent system more accessi-
ble to its people, as well. The Patent Reexamination Board, for
example, sends its members to various areas of China to conduct
investigations and hearings concerning patent validity issues so
that citizens outside the major urban centers may have more con-
venient and less costly access to this major administrative deci-
sion-making body.246 Much greater economic development, scien-
tific and technological training, and Chinese investment in R&D
is manifestly necessary, however, for improving access to the
P.R.C. patent system and for enabling Chinese citizens to achieve
technological advances worthy of patenting. If not already self-
evident, this proposition is underscored by 1996 statistics showing
probably reinstitute tight controls over students seeking to study in the United
States, and the INS is likely to tighten its visa restrictions, as well.
244 See Leslie Cataldo, A Dynasty Weaned from Biotechnology: The Emerging
Face of China, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 151, 154 (discussing the geo-
graphic expansion of intellectual property courts into municipalities, prov-
inces, and economic zones).
245 See ALFORD, supra note 10.
246 See id. at 372, 376 (noting that by 1992 there were fifty-four official
Administrative Authorities vested with the power to settle patent disputes in
the People's Court in cities with independent development planning, coastal
cities open to foreign investment, and the SEZs).
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that, of 43,780 patent rights granted by the Chinese Patent Office
(CPO), only 2,976 (7%) were for inventions, whereas 27,171
(62%) were for utility models (representing minor improvements
that were merely registered, not examined by the CPO), and
13,633 (31%) were for nonfunctional designs.247
Finally, when Chinese subjects are involved in the patent sys-
tem, there is a great deal of informal assistance in the interactions
between patent agents or attorneys, examiners in the CPO, and
judges hearing patent disputes. 4  The Chinese recognize that
their system is still very young, with much more development
required. Examiners help improve patent applications in a num-
ber of unorthodox ways, such as permitting a number of face-to-
face meetings with applicants and their agents/attorneys and re-
ferring applicants to particular attorneys having more knowledge
of the technology in question. Patent applicants in the United
States, Europe, and other nations with well-developed patent sys-
tems neither can, nor should, expect this kind of assistance. If the
Chinese patent system develops as planned, of course, the number
of patent applications and disputes will rise to the point where
such informal assistance will become impossible. When the Chi-
nese arrive at that point, however, the need for such assistance
should decline accordingly.
Although significantly more work is needed before China has
a stable and completely effective patent system, there is clearly
reason for optimism. One must keep in mind that the mere idea
of patents is quite new in China in comparison with most other
nations; the first real patent law is only fourteen years-old, and
many of its important provisions are only six years-old. The
combination of ancient cultural antipathy toward intellectual
property generally and patents particularly, the short twenty-year
period that has passed since the P.R.C. began even the first steps
toward economic modernization, and the even more youthful na-
ture of the patent system, should lead a rational observer to rec-
ognize that patience is needed. There was undoubted truth in the
statement of Mickey Kantor, then U.S. Trade Representative, that
the United States "would not wait forever.""' He made this
statement, however, less than one year after the 1995 Sino-U.S.
247 Yin Xintian, A Brief Introduction to the Patent Practice in China, 9
DuKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 253, 255 (1998).
24 See Cataldo, supra note 244, at 153-55.
249 Berkman, supra note 155, at 3 n.8.
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MOU. Perhaps it was necessary, as it led to yet another agree-
ment in 1996 centered on making Chinese markets more open."'
A knowledgeable non-political observer of circumstances in
China, however, may wonder whether the attitude expressed by
Kantor manifests a seriously myopic vision of the time frame nec-
essary to bring such major change to a country with China's
characteristics.25' While nudging China forward in its enforce-
ment of patent and other intellectual property rights, as well as
providing U.S. assistance to China's effort promised in the 1995
MOU, developed nations generally, and the United States most
particularly, must be patient. Despite the distance China still
must travel to reach its objectives, the West should view the glass
as half-full rather than half-empty because of the evidence of re-
cent progress at a rather rapid rate and an apparently real com-
mitment on the part of China to make the system work. These
signs tend to indicate that the current patent system in China ul-
timately will be a success.
The history of China demonstrates the slow pace of change in
Chinese institutions and culture. This is a self-evident proposi-
tion for any substantial change in complex social, economic, legal,
or political structures. Attempts to make rapid, fundamental
change, such as those aimed at introducing patent law in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century, or at the end of the Republi-
can period, are destined to fail. Perhaps the most important as-
pect of the current movement toward true recognition and en-
forcement of patent rights is its emphasis on long-term goals, such
as the construction of the educational, legal, and administrative
infrastructures demanded for patent law to possess meaning and
substance. Moreover, Western nations should be sensitive to
Chinese cultural and social conventions, and seek creative solu-
tions to patent controversies rather than force solutions on the
Chinese that do not fit China's cultural context. An effective sys-
tem for protecting patents and other intellectual property rights
can exist in a socio-political context other than that of liberal
democratic societies, albeit in a somewhat different form. Assum-
250 See id.
251 See Assafa Endeshaw, Commentary: A Critical Assessment of the US-
China Conflict on Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 295, 304-06
(1996) (asserting that the United States is seeking to impose intellectual prop -
erty standards on developing nations that even developed nations have trouble
attaining).
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ing that China continues on its current course, and with the
proper cooperation from the West, China can successfully com-
plete its transition to a patent-assisted system of technological ad-
vancement and corresponding economic growth. Although
China undoubtedly will incur problems along the way, especially
as economic progress brings the desire for freedom and civil rights
to the forefront of popular Chinese thought, many signs point to
the country's ultimate achievement of its almost unparalleled
economic potential.
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